Three Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory. by Simundza, Dan C.
Three Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory
by
Dan C. Simundza
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Economics)
in The University of Michigan
2011
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Daniel S. Silverman, Chair
Professor Tilman M. Borgers
Professor James Jondall Prescott
Assistant Professor Stephan Lauermann
Professor Lones A. Smith, University of Wisconsin
Acknowledgements
I want to thank my wife Danna, my family, and my advisors.
ii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Chapter 1. Criminal Registries, Community Notification,
and Optimal Avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2. The Economics of Performance Ratings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Chapter 3. When Should Governments Reveal Criminal Histories? . . . . . 51
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
iii
List of Figures
Figure 1.1 The Best Response Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Figure 3.1 The Effect of an Increase in ` . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Figure 3.2 The Effect of an Increase in δ1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Figure 3.3 The Effect of an Increase in β . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
iv
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Actions Undertaken in Response to Fear of Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Table 3.1 Criminal Population Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
v
Chapter 1
Criminal Registries, Community Notification, and
Optimal Avoidance
Introduction
Criminal registry notification laws provide information about offenders to
at-risk neighbors with the intent of protecting the community. This paper
investigates the effect of notification laws on the behavior of criminals and
their law abiding neighbors and derives optimal notification policies. In my
model, informed neighbors 1) can practice costly avoidance to protect them-
selves, and 2) better recognize and report criminal activity to the authorities,
thereby increasing the probability of catching repeat offenders. Notification
therefore generates opposing externalities: protecting oneself often comes at
the cost of exposing one’s neighbor, while increasing the probability of de-
tection helps to deter criminal activity. Put simply, informed neighbors face
a choice: remain outside in harm’s way and help to deter crime, or retreat
to the relative safety of their house at a cost.
Modeling the neighborhood as a game in which each informed family
independently chooses its avoidance level (i.e. fraction of the day to stay in-
doors), I first study how notification policies affect neighborhood behavior. I
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show that avoidance obeys strategic complementarities: the more the neigh-
bors stay inside, the higher the incentives for each family to remain indoors. I
prove that equilibria exist and are necessarily symmetric. Equilibrium avoid-
ance may increase or decrease in the notification rate depending on whether
informing the marginal citizen mainly serves to deter crime or decrease the
average amount of time spent outside.
With a better understanding of the neighborhood’s response, I turn to
the issue of designing optimal notification policies. The government controls
both the penalty on convicted felons and the notification rate, and the main
results of the paper highlight the importance of getting these two policy levers
working together.1 I show that there always exists a penalty large enough to
ensure that equilibrium avoidance decreases in the fraction of the population
informed. Whenever this is the case, social welfare is necessarily increasing
in the notification rate, and therefore maximized by a “scarlet letter” policy
which informs the entire neighborhood. The higher notification rate leads to
lower per-family expenditures on avoidance and higher deterrence, since the
probability of detection is larger when more informed people are outside.
But this sword cuts both ways because notification with too small of a
penalty is worse than useless: it is harmful. The informed alter their behavior
at non-negligible costs and impose negative externalities on their neighbors.
In this case, notification entails a cost but no benefit: the criminal is insuf-
ficiently deterred while residents suffer from staying indoors. If the penalty
is too small, the government is better off keeping the criminals’ identities se-
cret. By not releasing any information the government ensures society does
not waste energy on costly avoidance.
1The penalty could take many forms but all that matters in the analysis is the criminal’s
loss in utility from punishment. For instance, a fine of $1,000 may reduce a criminal’s
utility by the same amount as a year in prison. These penalties would be equivalent in
the model. The model is not dynamic so incarceration is not an issue.
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Background
The most well-publicized criminal registry notification policy is “Megan’s
law,” which requires states to notify the public of registered sex offenders
in their neighborhood.2 But there are registries and notification policies
for many other types of criminals. Some examples of approved or proposed
registries and notification policies are for criminals convicted of elderly abuse,
animal abuse, hate crimes, gang crimes and drug dealing [Welch [2008]]. Part
of the rationale for community notification is that these types of offenders
are especially prone to recidivism and often commit their crimes close to
home.3 Notification is thought to help at-risk neighbors protect themselves
by monitoring and avoiding the potential threats in their community. If the
community is made aware of criminals’ presence, they can take actions to
protect themselves.
In practice, governments do not directly choose what fraction of the neigh-
borhood to inform. But they do choose the method and intensity of noti-
fication, which together determine to a large extent the fraction informed.
Popular methods of notification include online databases searchable by any-
one with an internet connection, individual letters sent in the post, holding
a registry at the police station which can be accessed by those deemed “at
risk”, and door-to-door notification.4 Each of these methods entails different
costs. I ignore the physical costs of notification in this paper and instead
focus on the costs generated by the strategic interaction of the informed
neighbors. My goal is to clarify our understanding of the costly behavioral
2All 50 states currently have versions of Megan’s law in place.
3Hanson et al. [2003] report that recidivism rates amongst sex offenders are at least 14%
after 5 years, 20% after 10 years, and 30-40% after 20 years (these are understatements
because some crimes go undetected). While criminal behavior for sex offenders declines in
age of the offender, it does so more slowly than for other crimes (Hanson [2002]).
4Surveys described in Philips [1998], Kernsmith et al. [2009], and Lieb and Nunlist
[2008] provide information about notification methods and rates.
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response to notification.
The reasoning supporting notification is that informed neighbors can bet-
ter avoid potential threats, or at least limit their exposure. But as this paper
shows, information can be a burden to the community. Informed families al-
ter their behavior in order to reduce their chances of being victimized. Once
a family learns there is a potential danger, it can no longer be as carefree:
doors must remain locked, children must be supervised, and outdoor activ-
ity in general is curtailed. Such avoidance behaviors are costly. Along with
the administrative costs and potential harm to the criminal, the cost of the
neighborhood response should be a consideration in any cost-benefit analysis
for notification laws.
I model avoidance as displacing crime. When i stays inside more often, the
probability j is attacked increases because criminals are less likely to select i
from the crowd. The actual mechanism might be more subtle, but the results
are the same. With the informed inside more often, there are simply less
potential witnesses on the street, making crimes easier to commit. Further,
when the informed are inside they cannot warn their neighbors and protect
them as dangerous situations arise. If, in contrast, the informed stay outside
more often, deterrence increases because they know who the criminals are
and can watch over their neighbors. Criminals will be caught more often and
will therefore be deterred from attacking unless the opportunity is especially
good.
Literature Review
Since Becker [1968], the study of how criminals respond to incentives has
flourished. Recent studies have investigated the deterrence effects of police
and incarceration [Levitt [1997], Di Tella and Schargrodsky [2004]], condi-
tions in prisons [Katz et al. [2003]], and gun ownership [Lott [1998], Mialon
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and Wiseman [2006]]. Other papers study the relationship between reputa-
tion concerns and violent crimes [Silverman [2004]], incarceration’s effect on
the supply of crime [Freeman [1996]], the interplay of crime and vigilance in a
general equilibrium framework [Smith [2010]], and optimal law enforcement
[Eeckhout et al. [2010], Polinsky and Shavell [2000]]. My research adds to
this literature by studying an additional crime fighting tool available to the
government: community notification policies.
Previous research on criminal registries and notification policies has fo-
cused on sex offenders. These studies were primarily concerned with the
effect notification had on recidivism rates and offender well-being [Prescott
and Rockoff [2011], Adkins et al. [2000], Walker et al. [2005], Agan [2008]].
Much of this literature has difficulty finding any effect of registration and
notification on recidivism rates. Prescott and Rockoff [2011] show that reg-
istration programs reduce crime by providing police with better information
on offenders’ whereabouts, but the effect of notification programs is ambigu-
ous. Notification programs reduce first time offenses by effectively increasing
the penalty, but may increase recidivism rates by lowering the return to
non-criminal activities and thereby the incentives for good behavior.
In my model the crime rate increases in the notification rate only when
equilibrium avoidance increases sufficiently quickly. In such a situation,
higher notification rates lead to a higher fraction of uninformed people on
the street, making crime easier and more attractive.
The extent of the literature’s focus on neighborhood well-being is to quan-
tify the effect a nearby offender has on property values [Linden and Rockoff
[2008], Pope [2008]]. The results generally show a negative relationship be-
tween the existence of a sex offender and housing values, with the drop in
housing prices ranging from 2.3% to 18%. I take this as evidence that the
law-abiding public cares about the registry. Avoidance is unobservable and
difficult to verify but the correlation between house price and notification
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implies that individuals’ response to being informed is non-negligible.
This paper also contributes to a large literature on the value of publicly
disclosing information, of which Jin and Leslie [2003] and Dranove et al.
[2003] are particularly relevant. Jin and Leslie [2003] studies the restaurant
hygiene report card program instituted in Los Angeles and Dranove et al.
[2003] studies the health care provider report card program instituted in New
York. While more information to the consumer increases social welfare in Jin
and Leslie [2003], Dranove et al. [2003] find the opposite due to providers’
ability to “game the system”.
My result that notification can be welfare increasing or decreasing com-
bines elements of Jin and Leslie [2003] and Dranove et al. [2003] since in-
formed neighbors’ incentives may not be aligned with society’s. Once in-
formed, a family faces private incentives to protect itself by staying off the
street. From society’s point of view, this is exactly the wrong thing to do. In-
formed families should be outside as much as possible, thereby increasing the
deterrence effect and helping the entire neighborhood. Whether notification
or secrecy is optimal depends precisely on how much deterrence informing
provides relative to how much families keep off the streets. The government
imposed penalty is needed to generate sufficient deterrence so that incentives
are aligned and notification improves welfare.
Model
Motivation
Before going into detail, in this section I provide an intuitive story to motivate
the model. Consider a neighborhood consisting of a past offender (i.e. a
potential threat) and neighbors A and B. Suppose, due to low effort and
insufficient resources devoted to notification, only A becomes informed of
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the criminal’s existence. Neighbor A responds by undertaking avoidance
measures while B does not alter his behavior. This avoidance is costly, but it
reduces A’s probability of being attacked. If the offender wants to commit a
crime, the probability that B is the one attacked therefore increases. In this
way notification generates negative externalities.
The positive externality, deterrence, is generated by the following mech-
anism. When informed, A learns the offender’s characteristics and prepares
himself in the event of an attack. If A is attacked, he is more likely to iden-
tify the offender as the person he saw in the registry, whereas B might have
trouble remembering the characteristics of his attacker. The criminal is more
likely to be caught if he attacks an informed neighbor. The criminal knows
the government’s notification policy and computes the expected probability
of detection. Since he cannot identify who is informed, the deterrence helps
everyone in the neighborhood.
Model
The neighborhood has a mass of criminals, normalized to 1, and a mass
P > 1 of families. A fraction β of the families are informed of the criminals’
existence, while fraction 1 − β are uninformed and have no idea criminals
might be nearby.5 That mass βP of the families are informed is common
knowledge between the informed families and the criminals, but the criminals
cannot identify who is informed.
Informed families choose avoidance level a ∈ [0, 1], where a represents the
fraction of the day they “lay low” inside, away from harm. Avoidance level
a costs c(a), where c : [0, 1] 7→ [0,∞) is increasing and convex and satisfies
c(0) = c′(0) = 0. Uninformed families make no choice. I normalize the
5Later I will discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption and letting the unin-
formed do inference after observing a noisy signal of their neighbors’ actions.
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harm of being attacked to one; if a mass m of criminals attack i, his utility
decreases by m.
Criminals attack when the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs.
I assume the value criminal j derives from attacking a family is θj ∼ U [0, 1].
The realization of θj is known to the criminal before he decides whether to
attack. Attacking criminals randomly choose one (and only one) family to
attack. If he attacks and does not get caught his payoff is θj. If he attacks
and gets caught, his payoff is θj − τ , where τ is the penalty imposed by the
government. If the criminal does not commit the crime, he gets nothing; he
cannot target another family.
When the criminal attacks an uninformed family, he is caught with prob-
ability d, while attacking an informed family results in a detection rate of
D ≥ d. These values are known to the criminal and the informed families.
Family i’s expected cost of attacks when all other informed families use
avoidance level a and a mass of m criminals attack is
m
1− ai
P (β(1− a) + (1− β)) = m
1− ai
P (1− βa) (1)
Equation (1) shows that each family’s expected harm from attacks is equal
to the amount of time it spends outside relative to the total amount of time
all neighborhood families spend outside, scaled by the mass of attacking
criminals (and the cost of being attacked, which is one).6
There is a potential problem when everyone is informed and staying inside
all day because if family i considers spending any part of the day outside, it
will be attacked infinitely often. The following assumption guarantees there
will always be some families outside.
A1 The maximum amount of avoidance is a¯ < 1.
6Since I will prove that equilibria are necessarily symmetric, fixing the avoidance level
of all other families at a is without loss of generality.
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In order to guarantee interior equilibria, I also make the following assumption
on the cost curve.
A2 Staying inside all day is dominated by staying outside all day; that is:
c(a¯) > a¯
P (1−a¯) .
The qualitative results which follow do not depend on these two assumptions.
Without them, the analysis would be a bit tedious, mainly due to worrying
about corner solutions.
Comments
Since the neighborhood is composed of a continuum of agents, each individ-
ual’s actions has negligible effect on the community. The analysis will focus
on symmetric equilibria in which all informed agents take the same action.
So even though each individual family’s avoidance has negligible effect on
the community, there is an externality generated by the avoidance of the
informed as a group.
Avoidance generates strictly negative externalities in this paper. When
A stays inside more often, not only does the conditional probability that
B is attacked increase, but the level of deterrence decreases. This happens
because A is informed and entails the higher detection rate D. When he stays
inside more often, he is less likely to be randomly selected by the criminal,
and so the criminal faces a lower expected probability of being caught. It
is possible to imagine situations in which the action taken by the informed
generates positive externalities. As an extreme example, suppose all informed
families carry weapons at all times. This action would generate a positive
externality for the uninformed because the criminal would worry that his
potential victim is armed.
The literature on property values and notification laws reports significant
results only for very small distances (i.e. less than 0.1 miles). Therefore,
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I think of the mass of the law-abiding neighbors relative to the mass of
criminals as “small”. It is difficult to explicitly define “small” in this context,
but P should be small enough to generate incentives for avoidance, and to
make the externality effects relevant.
Non-Deterrable Criminals
I start by analyzing non-deterrable criminals to isolate one aspect of the
model. Without deterrence, notification generates purely negative external-
ities. Informed neighbors practice avoidance to protect themselves, which
shifts the expected cost of attacks onto their neighbors. This effect exists
in the more general model with rational criminals, but is especially easy
to see when criminals cannot be deterred by increases in the probability of
detection.
The economics of crime literature has largely proceeded under the as-
sumption that criminals respond to incentives. There is however evidence
that some criminals cannot be deterred from committing crimes.7 What is
important for this section is that non-deterrable criminals always commit
crimes; any opportunity is sufficient for them. The analysis here will be brief
7Lee and McCrary [2009] exploit the discontinuous increase in penalties as criminals
turn 18 years old. They find an extremely small response: criminals a few days younger
than 18 years old do not commit many more crimes than those a few days over 18 despite
facing much shorter jail sentences. This, as they point out, could be evidence that the
criminals are not responding to incentives, or simply myopia. Wright and Decker [1994]
and Cromwell and Olson [2003] both study samples of burglars who have committed
hundreds (and in some cases thousands) of thefts in their lifetimes. These criminals seem
unable to resist committing a crime if the opportunity presents itself. That said, even
these non-deterrable criminals regularly make “occupancy probes” in order to lower their
probability of detection. An occupancy probe might take the form of consulting funeral
announcements and/or contacting relevant houses by phone to make sure no one is home.
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with the intent of simplifying one aspect of the more complicated general
model.8
Informed family i takes as given the other informed families’ avoidance
levels and chooses ai to minimize the expected costs of being attacked plus
the costs of vigilance. That is, they solve:
max
ai
{
− 1− ai
P (1− βa) − c(ai)
}
Optimal avoidance is always interior because marginal benefits exceed marginal
costs at ai = 0, and assumption A2 ensures ai = a¯ is dominated by ai = 0.
Optimal avoidance necessarily satisfies the first order condition
1
P (1− βa) = c
′(ai) (2)
I write family i’s best response when all other informed families use avoidance
level a as ai(a). Family i’s best response function is increasing because c
′ is
increasing. The equation characterizing a symmetric equilibrium is
1
P (1− βa) = c
′(a) (3)
I will focus attention on equilibria that are locally dynamically stable.
Such equilibria might be observed as the outcome of a dynamic process in
which a small fraction of the informed neighbors adjust their avoidance each
period by best responding to the average avoidance level observed in the
neighborhood. The resting point of this dynamic process will be an equilib-
rium which is stable in that the best response to an avoidance level close to
the equilibrium pulls the average avoidance level closer to the equilibrium.
Equilibria which are locally dynamically unstable would never be observed
as the outcome of this process. I will give a practical definition of local dy-
namic stability here in the text, and discuss the issue in more detail in the
appendix.
8Important details like the existence of an equilibrium will be ignored for now but
proved for the more general model later in the paper.
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Figure 1.1 The Best Response Function
-
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a¯
ai(a)
x y z
Definition A symmetric equilibrium is locally dynamically stable if the best
response curve intersects the 45◦ line from above.
Figure 1.1 helps to illustrate this concept. In this figure, there are three
symmetric equilibria, labeled x, y, and z. Avoidance levels x and z are
locally dynamically stable because the best response curve intersects the 45◦
line from above, while avoidance level y is unstable.
We can now deduce equilibrium behavior as the fraction of neighbors
informed of the criminals’ existence increases. When there is no possibility of
deterrence, as the notification rate increases and more neighbors take refuge
in their house, the amount of time each stays inside increases.
Lemma 1. For non-deterrable criminals, equilibrium avoidance increases in
the notification rate.
Proof. As β increases, the left hand side of family i’s first order condition in
(2) increases. This means the best response curve shifts up. Since the best
response curve intersects the 45◦ line from above in any dynamically stable
equilibrium, the equilibrium avoidance level must increase as the notification
rate increases.
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Since criminals cannot be deterred from crime by the higher probability
of detection, the only externality at play here is the negative externality
of avoidance. A higher notification rate leads to more people who practice
avoidance. With more people practicing avoidance, the marginal benefit
increases, which in turn causes everyone to practice yet more avoidance.
Informed citizens face stronger incentives to stay inside, thereby increasing
the expected harm to anyone who remains outside on the streets.
In this case, the government’s optimal notification policy is to keep the
criminals’ identities secret. Define neighborhood welfare as the integral of the
neighbor’s utilities. Since notification entails costly avoidance but cannot de-
ter crime, the government maximizes neighborhood welfare by not informing
anyone of the criminals’ existence.
Lemma 2. For non-deterrable criminals, neighborhood welfare is decreasing
in the notification rate. The optimal notification policy is to notify no one.
Proof. Write equilibrium avoidance as a function of the notification rate as
a(β). Since the mass of attacks is always one, neighborhood welfare as a
function of the notification rate is
w(β) = −1− Pβc(a(β))
As β increases, both the fraction of the population bearing the cost of avoid-
ance and the amount of avoidance they use increases. Welfare decreases in
the notification rate and is therefore maximized at β = 0.
Notification policies, in the absence of deterrence, are harmful at the
societal level because they cause families to change their behavior (at a cost)
but do not affect the mass of criminals who attack. Notification merely
displaces crime from one group of citizens to another. The total amount of
crime stays constant while expenditures on avoidance increase. The welfare
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maximizing policy is to notify no-one, and thus ensure society does not waste
its effort on costly avoidance.
In order for notification to be good for the community, it therefore must
be the case that criminals respond to incentives. The only way for the com-
munity to be made better off by notification is for the crime rate to decrease
as more people learn of the criminals’ existence. When more people know
who is potentially dangerous, the criminals are more likely to get caught
committing a crime. They therefore become more selective in determining
when to attack, which decreases the danger to their neighbors.
Rational Criminals
I now turn to the more general model of rational criminals. The negative
externality isolated in the analysis of non-deterrable criminals is still present,
but it can be counteracted by the positive externality of deterrence. Crimi-
nals are more likely to be caught when attacking an informed neighbor, but
they cannot identify who is informed and who is not. Holding everything
else constant (including avoidance), higher notification rates therefore lead to
more deterrence. Counteracting this is the fact that once informed, neighbors
face a private incentive to practice avoidance which robs the neighborhood
of the desirable deterrence effect.
Rational criminals commit crimes when the expected benefits outweigh
the expected costs. Let δ represent the criminals’ expected probability of
detection, which will be determined by equilibrium behavior. The criminals
attack when (1 − δ)θ + δ(θ − τ) ≥ 0, or θ ≥ τδ. Since criminal values are
distributed uniformly on the unit interval, the mass of attacking criminals is
1− τδ.9
9Of course, this is only true if τδ ∈ [0, 1]. I restrict attention to this case because when
τδ > 1, no crimes are committed.
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A symmetric equilibrium is defined by a cutoff criminal value θ at which
criminals are indifferent between attacking and not, and an avoidance level
a which is optimal for each informed family given that all other informed
families use avoidance a. I will later show that any equilibrium is necessarily
symmetric, so the analysis proceeds under this assumption.
Recall that the probability of being caught when attacking an uninformed
family is d and the probability when attacking an informed family is D > d.
Criminals’ expected probability of detection in an equilibrium where the
notification rate is β and all informed families use avoidance level a is
δ(β, a) =
(1− β)d+ β(1− a)D
1− βa
The cutoff criminal value is therefore
θ = τ
(1− β)d+ β(1− a)D
1− βa
Family i’s problem is to minimize the expected costs of attacks plus the
cost of avoidance, taking other informed families’ avoidance level a and the
cutoff criminal value described above as given:
max
ai
{
−
(
1− τ (1− β)d+ β(1− a)D
1− βa
)
1− ai
P (1− βa) − c(ai)
}
Optimal avoidance is interior because marginal benefits exceed marginal costs
at ai = 0, and assumption A2 implies ai = a¯ is dominated by ai = 0. Family
i’s optimal avoidance necessarily satisfies the first order condition(
1− τ (1− β)d+ β(1− a)D
1− βa
)
1
P (1− βa) = c
′(ai) (4)
I write family i’s best response when all other informed families are using
avoidance level a as ai(a). A symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the
equation (
1− τ (1− β)d+ β(1− a)D
1− βa
)
1
P (1− βa) = c
′(a) (5)
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Note that avoidance obeys strategic complementarities. The expected harm
of attacks for a family who remains outside increases as the neighbors spend
more time indoors for the simple reason that there are less people on the
streets for the criminals to attack. Family i’s incentives for avoidance are
therefore increasing in the amount of avoidance their neighbors practice.
This can be seen in family i’s first order condition in (4) because both terms
on the left hand side are increasing in a, implying ai increases in a.
I start by studying the equilibrium behavior of criminals and neighbors
with the goal of getting a better understanding of how equilibrium behavior
depends on the notification rate. The following lemma shows that symmetric
equilibria exist, and further, that all equilibria are necessarily symmetric. It
does however allow for the possibility that multiple symmetric equilibria
exist.
Lemma 3. Locally dynamically stable equilibria exist and are necessarily
symmetric.
Proof. When a = 0, the left hand side of (5) is strictly positive while the
right hand side is zero. When a = a¯, assumption A2 guarantees the right
hand side is larger than the left hand side. The intermediate value theorem
guarantees there is some a ∈ (0, a¯) where (5) holds with equality. Moreover,
since ai(0) > 0 and ai(a¯) < a¯, the best response curve must cross the 45
◦
line from above at least once.
Equilibria are necessarily symmetric because the marginal benefit of avoid-
ance is independent of one’s own avoidance while marginal costs are strictly
increasing in own avoidance. It is impossible for marginal benefits to equal
marginal costs at two or more distinct avoidance levels.
Multiple symmetric equilibria may exist in this model. As in Section
, I will focus attention on locally dynamically stable equilibria. These are
the outcomes that we would expect to observe if the neighborhood arrived
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at an equilibrium through a dynamic process where each period a fraction
of the informed families best respond to their neighbors’ average avoidance
level.10 Practically, locally dynamically stable equilibria occur where the best
response curve intersects the 45◦ line from above.
The comparative static I am most interested in is how equilibrium avoid-
ance depends on the notification rate. The unambiguous result that equilib-
rium avoidance increases in the notification rate for non-deterrable criminals
in Lemma 1 derives from the fact that the term 1/(P (1−βa)), the marginal
benefit of avoidance when criminals are non-deterrable, increases in β for
all a. Rational criminals, however, can be deterred by notification; for fixed
avoidance, the probability of detection increases in the notification rate. This
means that the mass of attacking criminals, 1− τδ(β, a), decreases in the no-
tification rate. Whether equilibrium avoidance increases or decreases in the
notification rate depends on how much extra deterrence the marginal in-
formed citizen provides relative to how much less time the informed spend
outside.
Before answering this question analytically, it is useful to think about
how changes in the notification rate affect the best response function. If
an increase in β causes a sufficiently large increase in 1 − τδ relative to the
decrease in 1/(P (1 − βa)), the left hand side of the first order condition in
equation (4) increases. This causes agent i’s best response function to shift
upwards. Looking at Figure 1.1, we see that in any locally dynamically stable
equilibrium an upward shift in the best response function corresponds to a
larger equilibrium avoidance level. The opposite is true if the best response
curve shifts downwards.
Lemma 4. Equilibrium avoidance decreases in the notification rate if and
only if, as the notification rate increases and avoidance is held constant, the
10Please see the appendix for a more detailed explanation of this dynamic process.
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effect on deterrence is sufficiently large relative to the effect on the average
time spent outside per family.
Proof. Let pi(β, a) ≡ 1
P (1−βa) . Differentiating the left hand side of (4) with
respect to β gives
−τδβpi + (1− τδ)piβ
The best response function shifts downwards whenever this expression is
negative. Since the best response function intersects the 45◦ line from above
in any locally dynamically stable equilibrium, a downwards shift in the best
response function leads to a lower equilibrium avoidance level. Avoidance
decreases in the notification rate if
piβ
pi
<
τδβ
1− τδ
The left hand side of this inequality can be simplified to a
1−βa , so I re-write
the above as
a
1− βa <
τδβ
1− τδ
Since 1− βa = β(1− a) + (1− β), the left hand side of this inequality is the
percentage decrease in the average amount of time each family spends out-
side. The right hand side is the percentage decrease in the mass of attacking
criminals.
This result helps to clarify equilibrium behavior as the notification rate
increases. As more of the neighborhood learns of the criminals’ existence,
two things happen. First, there are more people who know to look out for the
criminals and can better recognize them if an attack happens. This raises the
probability an attacking criminal is caught and helps to deter crime. Second,
there are more people who can now practice avoidance. If the deterrence
effect of notifying additional neighbors is large enough, equilibrium avoidance
decreases; everyone can spend a bit more time outside because the mass of
18
criminals who have an incentive to attack decreases. If, on the other hand,
notifying additional neighbors mainly serves to take them off the streets and
increase the other families’ probability of being targeted by criminals, then
the equilibrium avoidance level will increase.
Building on the previous lemma, I derive a result on the shape of the
equilibrium avoidance function. Let a(β) be the equilibrium avoidance level
as a function of the notification rate. The following lemma is primarily useful
in proving the main results. Here I show that the equilibrium avoidance
function is either always increasing, always decreasing, or first increasing
and then decreasing in the notification rate.
Lemma 5. The equilibrium avoidance function is single peaked in the noti-
fication rate.
Proof. I show that whenever the slope of equilibrium avoidance equals 0, the
second derivative is negative. The slope of equilibrium avoidance, given by
the implicit function theorem, is
da
dβ
=
τδβpi − (1− τδ)piβ
(1− τδ)pia − τδapi − c′′(a) (6)
The second derivative when da/dβ = 0 is
d2a
dβ2
=
(τδββpi + 2τδβpiβ − (1− τδ)piββ)((1− τδ)pia − τδapi − c′′(a))
((1− τδ)pia − τδapi − c′′(a))2 ,
because τδβpi − (1 − τδ)piβ = 0 by assumption. The denominator is always
positive and (1− τδ)pia − τδapi − c′′(a) < 0 because the marginal cost curve
intersects the marginal benefit curve from below in any equilibrium. Simple
algebra gives
τδββpi + 2τδβpiβ − (1− τδ)piββ = τδβ δββ
δβ
pi − (1− τδ)piβ piββ
piβ
+ 2τδβpiβ (7)
Since
δββ
δβ
=
piββ
piβ
=
2a
1− βa > 0 ,
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the expression in (7) becomes
2a
1− βa(τδβpi − (1− τδ)piβ) + 2τδβpiβ
Since a′(β) = 0 when τδβpi − (1 − τδ)piβ = 0, second derivative a′′(β) <
0 whenever a′(β) = 0. This means a′(β) equals 0 at most once, and the
equilibrium avoidance function is quasi-concave.
Lemma 5 implies that if equilibrium avoidance is decreasing at β0, it is also
decreasing for any β1 > β0. Similarly, if equilibrium avoidance is increasing at
β1, it is increasing for any β0 < β1. This result is useful because the behavior
of equilibrium avoidance near the extreme values of β, which is often easiest
to determine, can give information about the interior range. For instance, if
limβ→0 a′(β) < 0, then we know that equilibrium avoidance is decreasing in
the notification rate at all possible notification rates. This fact will be used
to prove the main results.
Welfare
The analysis up to this point has been mostly positive in focus. Lemma’s 3, 4,
and 5 help us to understand how the neighborhood responds to being notified
an offender lives in their midst. In order to determine when notification is
optimal a measure of community welfare is needed. I define welfare as the
integral of the utilities of all of the neighbors living in the community, ignoring
the criminals.11 Then equilibrium welfare is
w(β) = −(1− τδ(β, a(β)))− Pβc(a(β))
The next Lemma relates neighborhood welfare to equilibrium behavior when
equilibrium avoidance is decreasing.
11Criminals only receive utility from successfully completing attacks. Including their
utility in the welfare calculation would partially offset the lost utility of the neighbors.
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Lemma 6. Social welfare is increasing in the notification rate whenever equi-
librium avoidance is decreasing in the notification rate.
Proof. Differentiating equilibrium social welfare with respect to the notifica-
tion rate gives
w′(β) = τ(δβ + δaa′(β))− Pc(a(β))− Pβc′(a(β))a′(β)
The terms δβ, δaa
′, and −Pβc′a′ are positive, so it suffices to show τδβ −
Pc(a(β))− Pβc′a′ > 0. I note three facts used to show this sufficient condi-
tion holds.
1. Since a(β) is equilibrium avoidance, it gives higher utility than using
a = 0:
−(1− τδ) 1− a(β)
P (1− βa(β)) − c(a(β)) > −(1− τδ)
1
P (1− βa(β))
⇒ (1− τδ) a(β)
1− βa(β) > Pc(a(β))
2. From Lemma 4, we know that a′(β) < 0⇒ τδβ > (1− τδ)piβpi .
3. From differentiating pi = 1/(P (1− βa)), piβ
pi
= a(β)+βa
′(β)
1−βa(β) .
The sufficient condition τδβ − Pc(a(β))− Pβc′a′ > 0 holds because
τδβ − Pc(a)− Pβc′a′ > τδβ − (1− τδ) a
1− βa − Pβc
′a′
> (1− τδ)
(
piβ
pi
− a
1− βa
)
− Pβc′a′
= (1− τδ)
(
a+ βa′
1− βa −
a
1− βa
)
− Pβc′a′
= (1− τδ) βa
′
1− βa − Pβc
′a′
= a′βP
[
(1− τδ) 1
P (1− βa) − c
′
]
= 0
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where the first inequality follows from Fact 1, the second from Fact 2, and
the first equality from Fact 3. The final equality holds because the first
order condition is satisfied at the optimal avoidance level. I conclude that
a′(β) < 0⇒ w′(β) > 0.
This result shows that when equilibrium avoidance decreases in the no-
tification rate, informing more neighbors makes the community better off.
Notifying more neighbors lowers the per-family expenditure on avoidance.
This increases deterrence because more people know and those who know
are outside more often. The proof shows that, despite increasing the mass of
families who use avoidance (and therefore adjust their behavior at a cost), a
marginal increase in the notification rate is welfare improving.
With these results in place, I now state and prove the main results of
the paper. These results demonstrate the importance of the government
imposed penalty in determining optimal notification policies. Specifically,
penalties and notification complement one another. I first show that for
severe enough penalties, equilibrium avoidance decreases over the entire range
of notification rates and, as Lemma 6 says, neighborhood welfare therefore
increases. This means that notification can be worthwhile for communities
if the government imposes sufficiently severe penalties on repeat offenders.
Proposition 1. There always exists a severe enough penalty so that full
notification is the optimal policy.
Proof. As the notification rate approaches zero, the slope of equilibrium
avoidance from (6) is
lim
β→0
a′(β) =
a(1− τd)− τ(1− a)(D − d)
Pc′′(a)
,
which is negative whenever
a
1− a <
τ(D − d)
1− τd (8)
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The right hand side of (8) increases in the penalty τ and gets arbitrary large
as τ → 1/d.
I now show that the left hand side of (8) approaches 0 for large enough
penalties. Define κ as inverse to marginal costs, so that κ(c′(a)) = a. As
β → 0, equilibrium avoidance satisfies limβ→0 a(β) = κ((1− τd)/P ). By the
properties of the cost function, κ is increasing and κ(0) = 0. As τ → 1/d,
both avoidance and the function a/(1− a) fall to 0.
Then as τ → 1/d, the left hand side of (8) approaches 0 while the right
hand side gets arbitrarily large. This means for large enough τ , limβ→0 a′(β) <
0. By Lemma 5, equilibrium avoidance decreases over the entire range of no-
tification rates and by Lemma 6 the neighborhood’s welfare is maximized by
notifying everyone.
Proposition 1 helps to understand both when and why community noti-
fication improves welfare. Severe penalties help the efficacy of notification.
Large penalties on their own can deter crime, but the effect is magnified
when coupled with community notification. The penalty and notification are
complements. Informed neighbors entail a higher probability of detection,
so the probability an attacking criminal has to pay the higher penalty in-
creases with notification. This lowers the chance that a criminal will attack
and also, importantly, the incentives for avoidance. The informed therefore
spend more time outside, further generating deterrence.
The community is effectively empowered by public notification in con-
junction with severe penalties. As more of the neighbors are informed, the
probability of detection continues to rise and so the informed can spend more
time outside instead of barricading themselves inside their house.
The next result provides a partial converse to Proposition 1 and is closely
related to the analysis of non-deterrable criminals. If the penalty chosen by
the government is too small, criminals will not be sufficiently deterred. In this
case, informing generates a burden on society because the community spends
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a lot on avoiding criminals but cannot completely insulate itself. Someone is
always left outside, providing an easy target for the attacking criminals.
Proposition 2. For small enough penalties, notifying no-one is optimal.
Proof. I will show that when the penalty is lenient enough, neighborhood
welfare is decreasing for all β, implying the optimal notification rate is β = 0.
Equilibrium welfare is w(β) = −(1 − τδ(β, a(β))) − Pβc(a(β)), and so the
slope is
w′(β) = τ(δβ + δaa′(β))− Pc(a(β))− Pβc′(a(β))a′(β)
I first show that for small enough τ , a′(1) > 0. When β = 1, the slope of
equilibrium avoidance equals
da
dβ
∣∣∣∣
β=1
=
Pτ(D − d)− (1− τD)a(1)
P 2(1− τD)β − P 2(1− a(1))2 − c′′(a(1))
Fix Me! The denominator is negative in any equilibrium, and for small
enough τ the numerator is also negative, implying a′(1) > 0. Lemma 5
ensures that a′(β) > 0 for all β whenever τ is small enough to make a′(1) > 0.
Then for τ small enough that a′(1) > 0, we know
w′(β) < τδβ − Pc(a(β))
because both δaa
′(β) and −Pβc′(a(β))a′(β) are negative. The term δβ is
bounded above by (D − d)/(1− a¯), so as τ → 0, we know τδβ → 0.
This means we can choose τ small enough so that both τδβ < Pc(a(0))
and a′(1) > 0 hold, guaranteeing that w′(β) < 0 for all β.
Very small penalties fail to deter crime, even if the probability of detection
is high. In the extreme case where τ = 0, even certain detection cannot deter
crime. Notification cannot generate sufficient deterrence with small penalties,
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despite the higher probability criminals are caught when attacking informed
neighbors.
But notification imposes costs on the informed because they face high
incentives to practice costly avoidance. From a welfare perspective, this
avoidance is wasted because neighbors cannot isolate themselves from the
criminals all of the time and crimes are committed. Notification has the
effect of making the informed work harder without providing any benefit to
the community.
As an extreme example, consider the limiting case of τ = 0. The model
is then identical to the model with non-deterrable criminals where avoidance
increases in the notification rate and welfare decreases in the notification
rate. Informing no-one therefore maximizes welfare.
Criminal registry and community notification programs are sometimes
thought of as a ways to keep offenders in “prison” even after they are released.
Registered criminals are watched over more closely by local law enforcement
and the community than if they were anonymous members of society. But
this additional “prison sentence” is not enough; it cannot act as a substitute
for a penalty. The community needs a sufficiently large penalty to use as a
threat against the criminal in combination with a notification policy.
These results highlight the importance of getting the government’s two
policy levers working together. Before deciding whether to notify, the gov-
ernment needs to determine if the penalty is such that notifying will help or
harm the community.
The results in Propositions 1 and 2 result in zero or full-on notification as
optimal policies. There are situations where the optimal notification policy
is some interior fraction of the population. That is, informing some but not
all of the neighborhood can maximize utilitarian social welfare. This occurs
when then penalty is in some sort of “middle ground”, neither severe nor le-
nient enough to generate unequivocal recommendations. Hence, Proposition
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2 is only a partial converse to Proposition 1.
Discussion
Communication Amongst Neighbors
One might be concerned that the government does not have complete control
over the notification rate. In particular, once the news that a potential threat
exists is released, neighbors might communicate amongst themselves. In this
way, even if the government notifies just a small fraction of the population,
everyone may end up learning of the threat indirectly through their neighbors.
In this subsection I discuss the incentives neighbors face to communicate
their information. I check when an informed agent’s utility is increasing in the
notification rate. If this is the case, the individual faces private incentives
to communicate his information to his uninformed neighbors. If utility is
decreasing in the notification rate, the informed do not want anyone else to
learn of the potential threat.
The magnitude of the penalty is again important in determining the in-
centives informed neighbors face to share their information. Large penalties
facilitate the sharing of information amongst the neighbors while small penal-
ties encourage the informed to keep their information private.
Proposition 3. The utility of the informed increases (decreases) in the no-
tification rate when penalties are sufficiently large (small).
Proof. I first show that the utility of an informed neighbor is decreasing
when τ = 0. I study utility at two notification rates, β1 < β2. Let ak be
optimal for βk and let Uk be the utility of the informed in equilibrium when
the notification rate is βk. Lemma 1 shows that avoidance is increasing when
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τ = 0, so a1 < a2. Then
U1 ≡ − 1− a1
P (1− β1a1)−c(a1) ≥ −
1− a2
P (1− β1a1)−c(a2) > −
1− a2
P (1− β2a2)−c(a2) ≡ U2
The first (weak) inequality holds because a1 is optimal when the notification
rate is β1. The second (strict) inequality holds because β1 < β2, avoidance
is increasing in the notification rate, and so β1a1 < β2a2. This shows that
the utility of the informed is decreasing in the notification rate when τ = 0.
Since utility and avoidance are continuous in τ , the utility of the informed is
decreasing in the notification rate for sufficiently small penalties.
I next show that an informed neighbor’s utility is increasing if avoidance
is decreasing, which Proposition 1 says occurs when the penalty is sufficiently
large. Write the utility of an informed agent as u(β) = −(1− τδ(·)) 1−a
P (1−βa) −
c(a). Then the derivative of utility in the notification rate is
u′(β) = τ(δβ + δaa′) 1−aP (1−βa) − (1− τδ)a−a
2+a′(β−1)
P (1−βa)2 − c′(a)a′
= τ(δβ + δaa
′) 1−a
P (1−βa) − (1− τδ) a−a
2
P (1−βa)2 + a
′
[
1−τδ
P (1−βa)
1−β
1−βa − c′(a)
]
= 1−a
P (1−βa)
[
τδβ − (1− τδ) a1−βa
]
+ τδaa
′ 1−a
P (1−βa) + a
′
[
1−τδ
P (1−βa)
1−β
1−βa − c′(a)
]
Whenever a′ < 0, Lemma 4 says that τδβ > (1− τδ) a1−βa , so the first term is
positive. The second term is positive because both δa < 0 and a
′ < 0. The
term
1− τδ
P (1− βa)
1− β
1− βa − c
′(a)
is negative because the first order condition says 1−τδ
P (1−βa) − c′(a) = 0 and
1−β
1−βa < 1. Then the last term is positive because both the term in square
brackets and a′ are negative. This means that when penalties are sufficiently
large, avoidance decreases in the notification rate and the utility of the in-
formed increases in the notification rate.
This helps to show that the result that penalties and notification are com-
plementary is not due to the fact that neighbors do not communicate. If the
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informed are allowed to communicate their information to their neighbors,
the government can facilitate this by using sufficiently large penalties. In this
case, by telling their neighbors, the informed can decrease their probability
of being attacked and their expenditure on costly avoidance.
Small penalties, on the other hand, cause the informed to keep their in-
formation private. Informing other people in the neighborhood causes more
families to practice avoidance, raising costs for all. In the future, I will
study situations where the informed face incentives to keep their informa-
tion private but society would benefit from its transmission. Such a case
would provide a clear justification for the role of governments in community
notification policies.
Public Good vs. Public Bad
The goal of this paper is to enhance our understanding of the effects of com-
munity notification on neighborhood behavior and welfare, and to determine
when notification is optimal. How agents respond to being notified that an
offender lives nearby is largely an empirical question. The action I study,
avoidance, generates negative externalities. Here I discuss the possibility
and implications of neighbors undertaking actions which generate positive
externalities.
Data on how people alter their behavior in response to the threat of crime
is scarce. I have not found studies which specifically deal with how neighbors
change their behavior upon being notified a criminal lives nearby through
community notification policies. In a national survey of 1,101 individuals,
Ferraro [1995] asks a more general question: what activities have respondents
undertaken to reduce their risk of crime? Their responses are summarized in
Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 shows that people take actions which have both positive and
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Table 1.1 Actions Undertaken in Response to Fear of Crime
Externality Action % Yes
Negative
Avoid Unsafe Areas - Day 51.7
Avoid Unsafe Areas - Night 75.3
Additional Locks on House 57.3
Buy Watchdog 24.5
Positive & Negative Additional Outside Lighting 57.5
Positive
Learn Self Defense 38.3
Keep Weapon in Home 40.7
Carry Defensive Object 18.6
Source: Ferraro [1995]. Responses from a nationally representative survey of 1,101 indi-
viduals.
negative externalities in order to protect themselves from the threat of crime.
For instance, avoiding unsafe areas only serves to make those areas more
unsafe for the people who must go there. Avoidance is thus a public bad.
On the other hand, criminals are less likely to attack if they are aware that
some potential victims know self defense or might be carrying a weapon. This
type of vigilance therefore creates a public good. Which effect dominates is
an empirical question I do not attempt to answer.
It is worth pointing out that sometimes local governments pass laws limit-
ing actions which generate positive externalities in this context. For instance,
Washington D.C. had a ban on residents owning handguns from 1976-2008.
I will refer to any action which generates positive externalities for the
neighborhood as “vigilance”. The probability of a successful attack is lower
against someone who is vigilant. Criminals are therefore less likely to attack
people if they know that some are vigilant. As more people use vigilance,
the deterrence effect increases.
If the actions people take entail positive as well as negative externalities,
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I expect notification to be optimal more often. That is, the results in this
paper are possibly pessimistic towards notification policies. While the policy
recommendation in this paper may be to not notify, a study which takes
account of the positive externality of vigilance behaviors may recommend
some positive amount of notification. Said differently, any time my results
advise notification, a model which also takes account of vigilance efforts
would also advise notification, but not necessarily the other way around.
Inference by the Uninformed
In this paper the uninformed are constrained to take no action. They are
unaware that something bad could happen to them. An interesting exten-
sion to this model would allow the uninformed to conduct inference after
observing a noisy signal which is correlated with the neighborhood’s behav-
ior. Uninformed people might look around while outside and notice there is
no one else out. The lack of people outside might be because everyone else is
indoors avoiding the potential threat, or simply for other irrelevant reasons
(away on vacation, out to lunch, etc.).
The uninformed would draw inference from the signal and, based on their
beliefs, determine their optimal amount of avoidance. An equilibrium of
this extended model would be the avoidance level of the informed, and the
avoidance level of the uninformed as a function of their signal such that each
is optimal given their beliefs and their neighbors behavior.
The level of avoidance in the neighborhood increases when the uninformed
are allowed to conduct inference and change their behavior. Obviously, their
avoidance level will be higher because previously it was zero. But the avoid-
ance level of the informed also increases because avoidance obeys strategic
complementarities; the marginal benefit of avoidance increases the more one’s
neighbors practice avoidance.
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Conclusion
This paper studies the effect of criminal registry notification policies on neigh-
borhood behavior. Informed neighbors practice costly avoidance measures in
order to protect themselves, which generates negative externalities for the
community. The negative externality of avoidance can be counterbalanced
by the positive externality of notification: notified neighbors are more diffi-
cult for the criminal to successfully victimize, generating deterrence effects
for the entire community. Whether notification is optimal or not depends,
in part, on the magnitude of these two effects.
The main results of this paper highlight the complementary nature of
penalties and notification. In particular, Proposition 1 shows that there
always exists a severe enough penalty to make notification optimal. The more
people know of the criminals’ existence, the more criminals are deterred and
the safer it is for neighbors to remain outdoors. Conversely, Proposition 2
shows that when penalties are lenient the government maximizes welfare by
not informing the community of the criminals’ existence. Notification leads
to costly expenditures on avoidance but insufficient deterrence; community
notification cannot act as a substitute for lenient penalties.
In addition to the physical cost of informing the neighborhood, noti-
fication policies entail costs for communities because the informed change
their behavior. Policy makers need to consider these behavioral costs of no-
tification when conducting cost-benefit analyses of community notification
programs.
Appendix for Chapter 1
This appendix describes how equilibrium in the model could be reached by
a dynamic process. The model is static, but since it aims to describe the
31
actions of a large group (continuum) of agents, it is helpful to think how
outcomes can result dynamically. The analysis in the main body of the
paper focuses on locally dynamically stable equilibria. As I will show, these
are the equilibria we would expect to observe as the outcome of a dynamic
process.
I will describe the dynamics first for discrete time, and then transform
the difference equation to a differential equation for continuous time. Let at
be the average avoidance of the informed at time t. Suppose that each period
a small fraction s of the informed best respond to the average avoidance they
observe in the neighborhood. Then the average avoidance level in period t+1
is
at+1 = (1− s)at + sai(at)
Re-arranging terms to get a difference equation gives
at+1 − at = s [ai(at)− at]
I now let the interval of time between periods shrink to ε. To keep the
system consistent as the length of time between periods shrinks I also scale
the fraction of the informed who best respond by ε.
at+ε − at = εs [ai(at)− at]
Dividing both sides by ε gives an expression of the time derivative of avoid-
ance
dat
dt
= s [ai(at)− at]
This equation says that the average avoidance level increases as time pro-
gresses if the best response to avoidance level a is above a. This makes
intuitive sense. If the agents who change their avoidance level are best re-
sponding by choosing a level greater than the neighborhood average, they are
bringing up the average. The opposite is true if the best response is below
the neighborhood average.
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We can now see why locally dynamically stable equilibria are character-
ized by best best response curves which intersect the 45◦ line from above.
This type of equilibrium is represented by avoidance levels x and z in Figure
1.1. Suppose the average avoidance level is slightly less than x. Then the
agents who best respond choose an avoidance level between the average and
x, pushing the average closer to the equilibrium. If the average is instead
slightly above x, then the best response is below the average but above the
equilibrium, resulting in a new average avoidance level even closer to the
equilibrium.
On the other hand, locally dynamically unstable equilibria have best re-
sponse curves which intersect the 45◦ line from below. This can be see by
looking at avoidance level y in Figure 1.1. If the average avoidance level is
slightly below y, then the share of agents who best respond to this avoidance
level choose an avoidance level even less than y. This drags the average level
down, away from the equilibrium y. If the average avoidance level is slightly
above y, then the best response is greater still, again pulling the average
away from the equilibrium.
Then starting from any distribution of initial avoidance levels, the resting
point of the dynamic system will be a dynamically stable equilibrium. We
would never expect the system to rest at an unstable equilibrium because
whenever the average avoidance level gets close to the unstable equilibrium,
the best response dynamics push the average away from the equilibrium. For
this reason, I focus only on locally dynamically stable equilibria in the paper.
These are precisely the equilibria where the best response curve intersects the
45◦ line from above.
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Chapter 2
The Economics of Performance Ratings
Introduction
In many economic environments, individuals’ excellence is publicly rated:
top chef, grandmaster in chess, employee of the month, etc. At the same
time, the rating serves as the de facto currency that individuals strive to
earn. Ratings therefore serve a dual purpose: they provide information and
incentives. This paper studies how well ratings can accomplish these two
tasks.
We develop a continuous time model of an agent whose performance is
publicly rated. Ratings update continuously with new performance score
realizations, while the individual’s talent also evolves. The innovation is to
allow for the agent to exert costly effort in order to improve his performance.
Thus the problem becomes one of moral hazard; talent is unknown and only
the agent knows how much effort was used. Since the performance score is
stochastic, a good showing could be the result of high effort, high talent, or
sheer luck.
Inspired by the characteristics of real-world rating systems, ratings in
our model update in a linear fashion. That is, tomorrow’s rating is a linear
combination of today’s rating and the most recent performance score. The
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rating update rule is similar to a Kalman-Bucy filter. In a filtering problem,
the “gain” (i.e. the weight placed on new information) adjusts over time in
order to minimize the mean squared error of filtering. In our problem, the
gain is chosen (and fixed forever) by the rating system designer in order to
achieve some goal of providing incentives and information.
We study a model in which utility over ratings is linear and the cost of
effort is quadratic. We show that by increasing the gain, that is, placing
more emphasis on new information in the rating update process, the rating
system designer can always elicit more effort. In contrast, there exists a
finite accuracy-optimal gain; any deviation from this gain erodes the quality
of the signal contained in the rating. If the gain is too low, ratings do
not incorporate new information quickly enough; too high, and information
contained in the old rating is wasted.
We then study the rating system designer’s problem. We show that his
optimal gain is always larger than the accuracy-optimal gain. If the gain is set
below the accuracy-optimal level, the rating system designer can elicit greater
effort and provide better information by increasing the gain. Further, we
prove that the more the rating system designer cares about effort, the larger
is his optimal gain. That is, ratings are more sensitive to new information
when the rating system designer cares more about effort.
Background
Rating systems abound in practice. The Elo rating system deserves particu-
lar mention because it provided much of the original motivation for this pa-
per. Arpad Elo invented his eponymous rating system for the United States
Chess Federation in 1960, and today Elo ratings are used by multiple chess
federations, professional tennis, golf, baseball and soccer, as well as various
computer games. Elo ratings are very similar to both the Kalman filter and
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our model in that ratings update in a linear fashion. The change in a player’s
rating is equal to a constant (called the “K-factor” in Elo ratings and the
“gain” in the Kalman filter) multiplied by the difference between realized and
expected performance. Our framework allows us to study the optimality of
the Elo ratings as used by various chess organizations. We present evidence
these ratings are sub-optimal; the K-factor is set too low. This means that
Elo chess ratings fare poorly on both the incentive and information fronts.
Performance ratings are also prevalent outside of the realm of sports and
games. One particularly well-known example is the Michelin Guide rating
system for restaurants. The number of stars each restaurant receives acts as
a signal of quality to the consumer. But it also acts as an incentive for chefs
to expend effort because higher effort produces better food, which improves
the rating, which leads to greater demand in the future.
Another practical example of performance ratings comes from online com-
merce websites such as eBay, where trading partners rate each other on the
quality of their transaction. These ratings serve as signals for future potential
trading partners: a higher rating for a seller signals a higher probability of a
successful transaction to the buyer. At the same time, a higher rated seller
might be able to command a higher price because buyers are less concerned
about theft. This generates incentives for sellers to make each transaction as
trouble-free as possible.
Ratings differ from rankings in that ratings are a cardinal concept, while
rankings are ordinal. Rankings can be derived from any rating system: the
highest rating is ranked number one, the second-highest rating is ranked
number two, etc. College football, for instance, maintains ratings throughout
the season, but the national championship game is played between the two
teams with the highest rating at the end of the regular season.
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Related Literature
This paper is an extension of Holmstrom [1999].12 Both papers study how
today’s effort affects current and future beliefs about ability, and how these
beliefs in turn generate incentives for effort. In Holmstrom [1999], wages
depend on beliefs about the agent’s ability, which are derived in a Bayesian
fashion from observing past output. Greater effort today can favorably alter
beliefs about the agents ability, but the magnitude of this effect is governed
by the rules of Bayesian updating.
In our paper, the agent derives utility from his rating. In contrast to
Holmstrom [1999], ratings may update in a non-Bayesian manner. For ex-
ample, today’s rating may depend solely on today’s performance; informa-
tion embodied in the old rating can be completely discarded. Alternatively,
ratings may be very insensitive to recent performance and slow to adjust.
We study how both the incentives for effort and the information content of
ratings depend on the way in which ratings update.
In our model, ratings act as a store of the agent’s reputation; the rating
encompasses all known information about the agent’s ability. There is a rich
literature on reputation in repeated games that is primarily concerned with
when and how agents can develop and maintain reputations (Kreps et al.
[1982], Kreps and Wilson [1982], Milgrom and Roberts [1982], Mailath and
Samuelson [2001]).
In the context of the chain store paradox model, Fudenberg and Levine
[1992] show that when there is uncertainty over the long-run player’s type and
imperfect monitoring of his actions, he can achieve an expected average payoff
arbitrarily close to what he could get if public commitment was credible. In
contrast, Cripps et al. [2004] show that this result is ephemeral. They show
that the long-lived player can maintain a permanent reputation for playing a
12In fact, our model subsumes the steady state of Holmstrom (1999). While Holmstrom
[1999] deals with dynamics along the path to the steady state, we do not.
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strategy in a game with imperfect monitoring only if that strategy eventually
plays an equilibrium of the corresponding complete-information game. If the
commitment types’ strategies are not equilibria for the normal (i.e. utility
maximizing) type long-lived player in the complete-information game, then
in any Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game the short-lived
players almost surely learn when the long-lived player is normal. For this
result it is crucial that the short-lived players observe all past signals. In
contrast, rating systems are often “forgetful”; that is, ratings discard old
information.
Ekmekci [2010] studies the ability of rating systems to act as reputation
devices. He shows that when the long-lived player’s type is unknown, there
exists a finite (i.e. forgetful) rating system and equilibrium of the resulting
game such that the long-lived player’s payoff is almost his Stackelberg payoff
after every history. The focus of Ekmekci [2010], therefore, is to show that a
rating system exists which satisfies certain properties. The focus of our paper
is to study how the structure of the rating system affects the information and
incentive content of its ratings.
While the settings and payoff functions are different, our result that opti-
mal ratings adjust more quickly than Bayesian estimates of ability is similar
to the main result in Dubey and Geanakoplos [2010]. They show that opti-
mal grading schemes in games of status (e.g. a classroom in which students
care only about their relative grade) trade-off informativeness for incentives.
By grouping different performances into one grade (i.e. an “A” grade for all
scores of 90, 91, . . . , 100, a “B” for all scores of 80, 81, . . . , 89, etc.), infor-
mation is lost but greater incentives for effort are created. We similarly show
that by over-weighting recent performance relative to the accuracy-optimal
rating system, the rating system designer discards useful information con-
tained in the old rating but creates greater incentives for effort.
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Model
For simplicity, there is only one agent whose performance is rated. Time is
continuous. The agent receives utility from ratings Utility is increasing and
linear over ratings, and is written u(r) = A+Br with B > 0.
The agent can use costly effort in order to improve his performance score.
The cost of effort is quadratic: using effort level ε costs ε2/2. The agent’s
discount rate is δ, and we write β = δ/(1− δ) as the interest rate.
The agent’s ability, which is unobserved, evolves in a mean-reverting man-
ner. Formally, ability obeys an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
dAt = θ(µ− At)dt+
√
L dW (t) , (9)
where W (t) ∼ N(0, t) is a Weiner process.
At each moment in time the agent produces output. Let the stock of
output at time t be St. The performance score is the change in this stock
of output; that is, Qt = dSt. The performance score is equal to ability plus
effort plus noise:
dSt = (At + ε) dt+
√
M dZ(t) (10)
where ε is the agent’s choice of effort and Z(t) ∼ N(0, t) is a Weiner process
independent from W (t).
The agent is assigned a rating at each moment in time. Provisional ratings
are such that R0 ∼ N(A0, σ20). If this were a filtering problem, ratings
generated by the Kalman-Bucy filter would be Bayes optimal.13 The Kalman-
Bucy rating update rule would be of the form:
dRt = θ(µ−Rt)dt+ ξt
M
(dSt −Rtdt) (11)
13The Kalman-Bucy filter (the continuous time version of the Kalman filter) is an algo-
rithm for updating Bayesian priors after observing signals of the underlying quantity.
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where the mean squared error of filtering ξt = E[(Rt − At)2] solves
ξ˙t = −2θξt + L− ξ
2
t
M
(12)
The fraction ξt/M is referred to in the filtering literature as the “gain”.
We, however, are not solving a filtering problem. Our rating system
designer picks a value γ and ratings update according to the Kalman-Bucy
inspired equation:
dRt = θ(µ−Rt)dt+ γ (dSt − E [dSt|Rt] dt) (13)
In keeping with the filtering literature, we refer to the rating system designer’s
choice variable, γ, as the gain.
We make the simplifying assumption that the current rating is the only
source of information available about the agent’s talent. In particular, the
agent is completely forgetful. He does not remember his past ratings, per-
formance scores, or effort choices. In order to decide how much effort to use
today, he infers his ability based solely on his most recent rating, and then
maximizes lifetime expected utility.
Statistical Analysis
In this section we study the statistical properties of the model. We first
show that ratings are unbiased signals of ability. This result simplifies the
calculation of E[dSt|Rt] in equation (13).
Then, since ratings are unbiased for ability, we determine which gain
minimizes the variance of the distribution of At|Rt. We call the gain which
minimizes the variance of the distribution of At|Rt the accuracy-optimal gain.
The conditional distribution of ability given a rating is centered at the rating
for all gains, but when ratings update using the accuracy-optimal gain, the
variance of the distribution is minimized.
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In order to show that ratings are unbiased estimates of ability, we first
assume that E[At|Rt] = Rt and then show that the distribution of At − Rt
has mean zero. Given our assumption that the agent is forgetful, his choice
of effort depends on his current rating alone. Write the equilibrium effort
function as e(R). Assuming that ratings are unbiased for ability and that
the agent uses the equilibrium effort level allows us to write
E[dSt|Rt] = E[(At + εt)dt+
√
MdZ(t)|Rt] = (Rt + e(Rt))dt
Substituting this and equation (10) into equation (13) gives
dRt = θ(µ−Rt)dt+ γ((At + e(Rt))dt+
√
MdZ(t)− (Rt − e(Rt))dt)
This equation can be simplified to
dRt = θ(µ−Rt)dt+ γ(At −Rt)dt+ γ
√
MdZ(t) (14)
Subtracting (14) from (9) gives
dAt − dRt = −θ(At −Rt)dt− γ(At −Rt)dt+
√
LdW (t)− γ
√
MdZ(t) (15)
We can write
√
L dW (t)− γ√M dZ(t) as √L+ γ2M dY (t) where Y (t) is a
standard Weiner process independent from W (t) and Z(t).14 Then defining
δt = At −Rt, equation (15) can be written
dδt = −(θ + γ)δtdt+
√
L+ γ2M dYt (16)
14To see that this is true, note that
E[
√
L dW (t) + γ
√
L dZ(t)] = E[
√
L+ γ2M dY (t)] = 0 ,
and
E
[(√
L dW (t)− γ
√
M dZ(t)
)2]
= E
[(√
L+ γ2M dYt
)2]
= (L+ γ2M)dt .
Since
√
L dW (t) + γ
√
M dZ(t) and
√
L+ γ2M dY (t) are both Gaussian, they are iden-
tically distributed because their first two moments are the same.
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This last equation describes the evolution of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
To see this more clearly, write (16) as
dδt = (θ + γ)(0− δt)dt+
√
L+ γ2M dYt (17)
The first two moments for δt are
E[δt] = 0 and E[(δt)
2] =
L+ γ2M
2(θ + γ)
But since δt = At −Rt, we have
At|Rt ∼ N
(
Rt,
L+ γ2M
2(θ + γ)
)
These calculations show that if we start with unbiased ratings, we end up with
unbiased ratings. Since the provisional ratings are assumed to be unbiased
(R0 ∼ N(A0, σ20)), ratings at any time t are also unbiased.
Since ratings are unbiased signals of ability, the accuracy-optimal rating
system minimizes the variance of the conditional distribution. The following
result relates the most accurate rating system to the Kalman-Bucy filter.
Proposition 4. The accuracy-optimal rating system is identical to the esti-
mator of the steady state Kalman-Bucy filter.
Proof. The variance for the conditional distribution of At|Rt is u-shaped in
γ. To find the variance minimizing gain, differentiate w.r.t. γ to get
∂
∂γ
[
L+ γ2M
2(θ + γ)
]
=
Mγ2 + 2θMγ − L
2(θ + γ)2
This term equals zero only when the numerator equals zero. Solving using
the quadratic formula gives the accuracy-optimal gain, γa:
γa =
√
θ2 +
L
M
− θ
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Equation (12) gives the law of motion for the mean squared error of the
Kalman-Bucy filter. Using the quadratic formula to solve for the steady state
mean squared error gives
ξ = M
√
θ2 +
L
M
− θM
Then since the gain in the filter is ξt/M , we see that the steady-state Kalman-
Bucy gain is the same as the accuracy-optimal gain, γKB = γa.
This proof shows that the accuracy-optimal gain exists and is finite. Any
deviation from this gain results in less informative ratings. If the gain is
set too low, ratings do not incorporate the new information contained in the
performance score realizations quickly enough. If the gain is set too high,
information contained in the old rating is wasted.
The accuracy-optimal rating system and Bayesian updating coincide in
the steady state. On the path to the steady state, the Bayesian gain adjusts,
but this is not how rating systems work. The rating system’s gain is fixed
from the begining and, after sufficient time, the system approaches the steady
state where the conditional distribution of ability given a rating is unchanged
over time. This is when the accuracy-optimal rating system and Bayesian
updating are identical.
The last important step in the statistical analysis before turning to eco-
nomic questions is to write the law of motion for ratings in terms of ratings
alone. That is, we must get rid of terms involving ability and performance.
This equation will be used to determine the agent’s optimal effort.
Using the result on the distribution of δt, we can re-write equation (14).
The steady state distribution of δt is Normal with mean zero and variance
equal to (L + γ2M)/2(θ + γ). We can write δtdt =
√
L+γ2M
2(θ+γ)
dZˆ(t), where
Zˆ(t) is an independent Weiner process. Then equation (14) becomes
dRt = θ(µ−Rt) + σ(γ)Wˆ (t) (18)
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where Wˆ (t) is an independent Weiner process and
σ(γ) = γ
√
L+ γ2M
2(θ + γ)
+M (19)
Equation (18) gives us a stochastic differential equation governing the evolu-
tion of ratings in a steady state equilibrium. We will now use this equation
to study the agent’s problem.
Economic Analysis
We now turn to studying the agent’s optimal choice of effort and the rating
system designer’s optimal rating system. With linear utility and quadratic
cost of effort, the model can be solved analytically.
We first fix the rating system and solve for the agent’s optimal effort.
Once we understand the determinants of effort, we study the rating system
designer’s problem. The rating system designer has preferences over the
accuracy of the ratings and the effort level they induce. We characterize
optimal rating systems for different preferences of the rating system designer.
The restriction to quadratic cost of effort allows us to describe precisely how
optimal rating systems depend on the designer’s preferences over providing
information and incentives.
Optimal Effort
With the law of motion for ratings given, we can now turn to studying the
agent’s optimal effort function. Given his current rating, the agent chooses
his effort in order to maximize his expected discounted lifetime utility from
ratings less the cost of effort. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the
agent with rating r is
βv(r) = max
ε
{
A+Br − ε
2
2
+ [θ(µ− r) + γ(ε− e(r))] v′(r) + σ
2(γ)
2
v′′(r)
}
(20)
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This equation gives the expected return to the agent having rating r. Think
of A+Br− c(ε), the instantaneous utility from ratings less the cost of effort,
as the dividend, and the rest of the right hand side as the expected capital
gain. We now show that with linear utility over ratings, the value function
is linear and increasing in the agent’s rating, and the agent’s optimal effort
level is constant for all ratings.
Lemma 7. With linear utility over ratings, the value function is linear and
optimal effort is constant.
Proof. Let v(r) = C + Dr. Then v′(r) = D and v′′(r) = 0. Equation (20)
can be re-written as
β(C +Dr) = max
ε
{
A+Br − ε
2
2
+ [θ(µ− r) + γ(ε− e(r))]D
}
The first order condition for optimal effort is ε = γD. The second order
condition is met because the cost of effort function is convex. We find values
of C and D satisfying the above value function to show that optimal effort
is independent of rating. Let e∗ denote optimal effort.
Then the equilibrium value function (i.e. when the rating system correctly
predicts and accounts for optimal effort, so that ε− e∗ = 0) solves
β(C +Dr) = A+Br − (e
∗)2
2
+ [θ(µ− r)]D (21)
Taking the derivative in r and solving for the slope of the value function gives
D = B/(β + θ). This means that optimal effort is e∗ = γB/(β + θ).
Making this substitution and then solving equation (21) for the constant
C gives
C =
1
β
(
A− 1
2
(
γB
β + θ
)2
+
θµB
β + θ
)
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The analysis with linear utility over ratings is very similar to the model in
Holmstrom [1999]. In fact, when ratings are updated in a Bayesian manner
(i.e. when γ = γKB), the models are identical in the steady state. While
posterior beliefs over ability are formed in a Bayesian manner in Holmstrom
(1999), our formulation allows for non-Bayesian updating of ratings. The
rating encompasses all known information about the agent. Proposition 4
shows how the information content of ratings depends on the gain. The
following result describes how the incentive content of ratings depends on
the gain.
Proposition 5. With linear utility over ratings, effort increases and value
decreases in the gain. Further, effort increases in the slope of the utility
function and decreases in the strength of mean reversion.
Proof. From Lemma 7, optimal effort is e∗ = γB/(β+θ), and so is increasing
in the gain. If the strength of mean reversion (θ) increases, optimal effort
falls.
Value decreases in the gain because the constant C decreases as the gain
increases because a larger gain leads to larger expenditures on effort for all
ratings.
Value decreases when the gain increases because the agent optimally in-
creases his effort level but he is in no way compensated for his effort. The
rating system expects he will work harder and simply adjusts its inference
on performance accordingly. The equilibrium law of motion of ratings is in-
dependent of the gain, even though the agent tries harder when the gain is
larger. This is what Holmstrom [1999] very appropriately terms a “rat race”.
In Proposition 4 we showed that the accuracy-optimal gain is a function of
the strength of the mean reversion of ability and the underlying noise terms.
Any gain above or below γa results in less accurate ratings, in the sense that
the variance of the distribution of A|R is larger the more γ deviates from
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γa. In contrast, Proposition 5 shows that larger gains always induce greater
effort.
The more quickly utility rises in rating the larger is the agent’s optimal
effort. This is because each unit of effort has greater return in utility. As
the rate of mean reversion increases, optimal effort falls because the return
to effort becomes more ephemeral.
Optimal Rating Systems
The rating system designer has preferences over the (steady state) accuracy
of ratings and the effort his rating system induces. His only task is to set the
gain and then let the system flow uninterrupted.
Our main result in this subsection establishes the tradeoff faced by the
rating system designer. If the designer’s preferences are such that more
accuracy and effort are always better than less, the optimal gain is larger
than the accuracy-optimal gain. The ratings are therefore less informative
than those formed with a Bayesian rating system, but the equilibrium effort
level is greater.
Since the optimal gain is set above the accuracy-optimal gain, ratings
have more noise than Bayesian estimates of ability. This is because the
ratings are relatively more sensitive to recent performance. This sensitivity
is what gives the agent greater incentives for effort; as the gain increases, so
does his ability to influence his rating via effort.
The rating system designer’s preferences are assumed to place η weight
on effort and 1−η weight on accuracy. We write the rating system designer’s
utility as
u
(
e∗, E[(A−R)2]) = η e∗ − (1− η)E[(A−R)2]
= η
γB
β + θ
− (1− η)
(
L+ γ2M
2(θ + γ)
)
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The rating system designer’s utility is increasing in the equilibrium level of
effort; he wants his agents to try hard. But he pays a penalty proportional
to the variance of the distribution of ability given a rating; all else equal, he
wants accurate ratings.
The following proposition characterizes optimal rating systems. If the
rating system designer cares about both the accuracy of the ratings and the
incentives for effort they provide, he trades off accuracy for effort.
Proposition 6. With linear utility over ratings, optimal rating systems place
at least as much emphasis on recent performance as the Bayesian rating
system. Further, the emphasis placed on recent performance increases in the
rating system designer’s preference for effort.
Proof. When η = 0, the rating system designer cares only for the accuracy
of the ratings. In order to maximize his utility, he uses γ = γKB because this
is the gain that minimizes the variance of the distribution of ability given a
rating.
For η ∈ (0, 1), the first order condition for the rating system designer’s
choice of γ is
η
B
β + θ
= (1− η)Mγ
2 + 2Mθγ − L
2(θ + γ)2
(22)
Since the variance of the distribution of A|R is u-shaped in γ, the fraction
on the right hand side of (22) is negative if γ < γKB, so the optimal gain
must be greater than γKB when η > 0.
To show that the emphasis placed on recent performance increases when
the rating system designer cares relatively more about effort, it suffices to
show that the γ which satisfies the first order condition in (22) increases in
η. Let γ′ be optimal for η′. Then, for η′′ > η′, the two sides of equation (22)
evaluated at η′′ and γ′ cannot be equal; the left hand side must be larger.
Since γ′ is optimal for η′ and we know the rating system designer would never
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optimally set γ < γKB, the fraction on the right hand side is increasing in γ.
In order to restore equality, the gain must increase to some γ′′ > γ′.
An important implication of this result is that optimal ratings always
adjust more quickly than Bayesian ratings. If ratings are adjusted more
slowly than Bayesian ratings, the rating system designer could increase the
gain and generate more accurate ratings which also induce greater effort. At
the Bayesian optimal gain, the cost of increasing the gain a small amount in
terms of lost accuracy is second order, while the benefit in terms of increased
effort is first order. Therefore, so long as the rating system designer cares for
both effort and accuracy, he sets the gain strictly larger than the Bayesian
optimal level. This generates less accurate ratings, but implements greater
effort.
The more the rating system designer cares about effort, the larger is the
optimal gain. If the rating system designer does not care about accuracy
at all (i.e. η = 1), there is no optimal rating system. He would want to
keep setting the gain larger and larger, and there is no upper bound. The
problem is that effort increases in the gain, and the rating system designer
could theoretically set the gain arbitrarily large. This generates both large
rewards for exceeding expectations, and large penalties for failing to meet
them.
Conclusion
This paper presents a model in which the incentive and information aspects
of performance ratings can be studied. We show that ratings cannot be both
statistically accurate and provide maximal incentives for effort. Accuracy-
optimal rating systems update in a manner similar to the Kalman-Bucy filter,
efficiently blending information contained in the old rating with new infor-
mation contained in the recent performance score realization. We show that
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the rating system designer can always elicit greater effort by placing more
emphasis on the agent’s recent performance score. When the rating sys-
tem designer prefers more effort and information to less, he faces a tradeoff:
ratings can elicit greater effort only at the cost of being less informative.
The world of competitive chess, as mentioned in the introduction, pro-
vides one practical application for our results. Interestingly, Sonas [2002]
finds that the K-factor used by the World Chess Federation is less than the
accuracy-optimal level.15 Currently, the K-factor for players with ratings
above 2400 is 10. Sonas claims that a K-factor of 24 maximizes the accuracy
of the ratings in the sense that ratings with this K-factor provide the most
predictive power. Supposing this claim is in fact true, our main result sug-
gests that the World Chess Federation could increase both the information
and the incentives generated by its ratings by increasing the K-factor. If
greater effort leads to more exciting and creative play, these results indicate
that the World Chess Federation is not using optimal ratings.
15Recall that the K-factor in chess ratings is analogous to the gain in our model.
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Chapter 3
When Should Governments Reveal Criminal Histories?
Introduction
Governments often possess information about their citizens’ criminal histo-
ries. When this information is released to the general public can affect the
criminals’ incentives for good behavior. This paper investigates the effects
of the timing of the government’s notification policy and determines optimal
policies when the government is concerned with both the crime rate and the
lost productivity of the criminal population.
Practical examples abound: should someone who was caught stealing
once be required to reveal this fact on future job applications? When should
a sex offender’s identity be revealed to his neighbors? Publicly-known crim-
inals may have difficulty getting jobs and might be ostracized from their
communities. The penalty incurred by notification helps to deter first-time
offenders but is costly because of the loss of productive members of society.
Further, public notification after the first conviction diminishes the govern-
ment’s ability to deter repeat offenders. Since publicly known criminals are
already underemployed and or ostracized, the government cannot threaten
them with any additional penalties in the labor market.
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I construct a discrete time, infinite horizon model where criminals ob-
serve opportunities each period and decide whether or not to commit the
crime. The government chooses between a “strict” policy which publicly
discloses criminal histories immediately upon first conviction, or a “lenient”
policy which temporarily conceals this information and only reveals it after
the criminal’s second conviction. When the government is strict, there are
only two types of criminals: the publicly known and the unknown. When
the government is lenient, there are again the publicly-known and the un-
known criminals, but there is also a third, intermediate type, with one prior
conviction who is known to the authorities but not the public as a criminal.
I study the behavior of criminals in these different situations, compute the
steady state distribution of criminals under each notification policy, and then
compare the overall crime rates.
I show that the lenient policy minimizes the crime rate when the following
three conditions jointly hold: public notification has a large negative effect
on wages, a small positive effect on detection probabilities, and criminals
have a long expected lifetime. In order to prove this result, I show in a
sequence of lemmas that criminals without any convictions always commit
more crimes when the government is lenient, and that the behavior of publicly
known criminals is independent of notification system. The behavior of the
criminals with one conviction under the lenient system is therefore pivotal to
the ordering of the crime rates. When public notification has a large negative
effect on wages and a small positive effect on detection probabilities, criminals
with one conviction under the lenient system commit few crimes because the
expected benefit is small. When criminals also have a long expected lifetime,
the steady state population consists of a sufficiently large fraction of well-
behaved criminals with one conviction under the lenient system, leading to
a low overall crime rate.
In addition to the crime rate, society may care about the productivity of
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its citizens. Public notification of criminal histories can be harmful because
those who are known as criminals have a hard time finding gainful employ-
ment and being a productive member of society. This provides an additional
justification for leniency on the part of the government. Sometimes otherwise
law abiding citizens are presented with an opportunity to commit a crime
that they find difficult to ignore. If they are caught and the government’s
notification policy is strict, the public is immediately informed of their deed
and the criminals cannot find gainful employment.
I show that there are always less publicly known criminals under the le-
nient notification system than under the strict system. This means that a
larger fraction of the criminal population is employed under the lenient sys-
tem, so productivity is higher. The more society cares about the productivity
of its citizens, the more appealing the lenient notification system becomes.
Related Literature
Economists have been interested in how criminals respond to incentives since
Becker [1968]. More recently, economists have investigated the deterrence
effects of police and incarceration [Levitt [1997], Di Tella and Schargrodsky
[2004]], conditions in prison [Katz et al. [2003]], and gun ownership [Lott
[1998], Mialon and Wiseman [2006]]. These papers validate Becker’s seminal
work by showing that criminals respond to incentives in a rational manner.
My research adds to this literature by studying an additional crime fighting
tool available to the government: public notification policies.
The most well-known public notification policy is Megan’s Law, a federal
law in the U.S. which requires states to make information about sex offenders
available to the public. But public notification policies also exist (or are
currently being developed) for criminals convicted of homicide, gang crimes,
animal abuse, elderly abuse, drug dealing and manufacturing, and drunk
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driving [Goode [2011]]. As they are politically popular and becoming more
prevalent in practice, it is important to understand when and how public
notification policies can be helpful.
Neto [2006] studies how the public availability of criminal records affects
behavior. He constructs a model in which agents can commit crimes in each
of two periods. Agents are heterogeneous in their ability and their taste
for criminal acts, and those who commit crimes in the first period learn
about their proficiency. If the government makes criminal records publicly
available, a criminal’s payoff for good behavior decreases because a fraction
of employers perform background checks and will not hire anyone with a
record.
My work builds on Neto [2006] by exploring more fully how agents’ dy-
namic incentives are affected by the government’s notification policy. The
government can control not just if, but also when, criminal records become
publicly available. The model in Neto [2006] captures the intuition that,
by making criminal records publicly available, criminals without any prior
convictions face greater deterrence, but those with a record commit more
crimes because their payoff to honest work decreases. In addition to this
type of intuition, my model shows how the timing of the government’s dis-
closure affects criminal behavior. If the government gives the criminals an
extra chance before disclosing their criminal past, criminals without any prior
convictions are less likely to be deterred while those with one conviction are
more likely to be deterred. I also show how concern for the lost productivity
of publicly known criminals can affect the government’s choice of when to
disclose criminal histories.
Economists interested in crime have also studied the optimal penalty
size as a function of the number of convictions. While the punishment for
many crimes is higher for recidivists than first time offenders in practice, the
literature does not always find increasing penalty functions to be optimal.
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Polinsky and Rubinfeld [1991], Rubinstein [1979], and Rubinstein [1980] all
show that, under different model specifications, increasing penalties may be,
but are not always, optimal. In contrast, Chu et al. [2000] show that if society
has a distaste for wrongful convictions of the innocent, the penalty for repeat
offenders is always greater than the penalty for first time offenders.
While public notification of criminal histories is a de facto penalty on
convicted criminals, it is of a different sort from the penalties studied by the
optimal penalty function literature. In the studies surveyed here, penalties
are “one-dimensional” and are construed as any and all actions or policies
which lower the utility of a convicted criminal. In contrast, public notification
policies are seen as a way to keep criminals “behind bars” even after they
are released from prison. That is, an informed community can help monitor
convicted criminals and make it more difficult for them to get away with
crimes. Public notification penalizes criminals not just by hurting their job
market prospects, but also by making it less likely to commit crimes without
detection.
This paper contributes to the literature on penalty functions by studying
how the implicit penalty associated with public notification, combined with
statutory penalties, determines the overall shape of the penalty function.
Holding statutory penalties constant, the strict policy generates a decreasing
penalty function because the immediate notification leads to a large penalty
for first time offenders but does not affect the penalty for repeat offenders.
The lenient policy generates a first increasing and then decreasing penalty
function because criminals are penalized by public notification only after
the second conviction. Depending on its objectives, the government will
sometimes use relatively small penalties on first time offenders in order to
hold a larger penalty in reserve to deter repeat offenders.
Economists also empirically study the effects of criminal registration and
public notification policies. Prescott and Rockoff [2011] presents evidence
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that notification policies can deter crime by first time offenders and increase
the crime rate for known criminals. They also find evidence that the detec-
tion rate for intermediate types (i.e. criminals known to the police but not the
public) is larger than the detection rate for those without any prior convic-
tions. If this detection rate is high enough, their findings and the theoretical
results in this paper imply that society might be better off temporarily con-
cealing information. Governments could adopt a two-step program where
first time offenders are registered with the police, but their identities are
made public only if they commit another crime. In such a case, separating
the registration and notification policies generates a lower crime rate.
My results indicate that empirical research might productively focus in
two areas. First, how do detection probabilities depend on the transmission
of information from governments to citizens? How much does the detection
probability increase as the criminal transitions from unknown, to known only
to the police, to a publicly known criminal? The answer to this question can
help us predict how useful notification policies will be for different crimes.
Secondly, how much do publicly known criminals suffer in terms of lost
wages? Several studies report mixed results on the effect of arrests on em-
ployment and earnings [Grogger [1995], Holzer et al. [2004], Waldfogel [1994]],
but none of these studies deals specifically with public notification policies.
If the effect of public notification on employment is large and negative, my
results indicate that governments should consider temporarily delaying pub-
lic notification and allowing criminals a second chance before outing them to
their neighbors.
Model
The initial mass of criminals is one, and they face a constant probability of
death equal to 1 − β. Each period a mass 1 − β of new criminals without
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any criminal history enter the population to replace the dead, so their mass
stays constant at one.16
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. Each period criminals en-
counter a criminal opportunity θ ∼ U [0, 1], iid, and must decide whether to
behave or to commit the crime. If the agent commits the crime he receives
utility of θ. If the criminal is caught committing the crime, he pays a penalty
of τ . Thus, a criminal committing a crime who is not caught receives θ, while
a criminal who is caught receives θ − τ .
There are many possible ways in which criminal histories, known by the
authorities, can be conveyed to the public. The two information systems
studied here are denoted S for “strict” and L for “lenient”. Let h ∈ {0, 1, . . .}
be the criminal history where h = k stands for k convictions; the public does
not observe h. The information given to the public is a “criminal rating” of
r = g or r = b for “good” and “bad”, respectively. Each information system
has a message function m which maps history to ratings.
Under the strict system, agents get good ratings only if they have a perfect
history. That is:
mS(h) =
{
g if h = 0;
b if h ≥ 1.
This system perfectly reveals the government’s information by identifying
everyone convicted of a crime.
Under the lenient system, criminal status is temporarily concealed from
the public. I study the case where:
mL(h) =
{
g if h ≤ 1;
b if h ≥ 2.
16This normalization of the mass of criminals is purely for convenience. Since the notifi-
cation policy does not affect the size of the criminal population and the relevant comparison
is across notification policies, the size of the criminal population will not affect the ranking
notification systems.
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The authorities know the agent is a criminal if h = 1, but the lenient system
hides this fact from the public. Only if they are convicted of another crime
will their public rating change to r = b.
Independent of criminal activity, agents collect any income they earn in
the labor market at the start of the period.17 Labor income is a function of
public rating where
`(r) =
{
0 if r = b;
` if r = g.
(23)
The probabilities of detection are given by δS(h) and δL(h). Agents with-
out any history of crimes face the lowest probability of detection because
neither the public nor the authorities know they are criminals. Agents with
a public bad rating face the highest probability of detection because every-
one knows they are criminals and can keep a close eye on them. Agents with
h = 1 and r = g under the lenient system face an intermediate probabil-
ity of detection because the authorities, but not the public, know they are
criminals. For 0 < δ < δ1 < δ < 1, the detection probability functions are
δS(h) =
{
δ if h = 0;
δ if h ≥ 1.
δL(h) =

δ if h = 0;
δ1 if h = 1;
δ if h ≥ 2.
Criminal Behavior
The ultimate goal of this paper is to answer the question: “When should
the government reveal criminal status?” In order to answer this question,
17As noted, the interpretation could instead be utility from maintaining good social
relationships.
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I start by studying how criminals’ behavior depends on the timing of the
government’s disclosure policy.
As previously stated, I restrict attention to two policies for the govern-
ment: the strict policy which reveals criminal status upon first conviction,
and the lenient policy which temporarily conceals the criminal’s past and
reveals it only upon the second conviction. I begin the analysis by studying
the strict system because there are only two types of criminals, and the me-
chanics for studying the lenient system are very similar. Once we know the
behavior of individuals in different situations under each notification system
we can derive the steady state crime rate for society.
The Strict System
At the start of a period, agents collect any labor income `(mS(h)) and observe
θ and then decide whether to behave or commit the crime. If the agent
behaves, tomorrow’s history equals today’s and the continuation value is
known with certainty. Committing the crime has an expected immediate
return of θ − δS(h)τ and the continuation value depends on whether or not
the agent is caught. If he is not caught, tomorrow’s history equals today’s
while getting caught entails a longer criminal record and a possibly worse
public rating.
Using primes to represent the value of a variable next period, I write the
value function for an agent with history h and opportunity θ under the strict
system as
v(h, θ) = max { `(mS(h)) + βEθ[v(h, θ′)],
`(mS(h)) + θ − δS(h)τ + βEh,θ[v(h′, θ′)]}
The criminal decides between committing the crime or not. By not com-
mitting the crime (the first argument inside the max operator), the criminal
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forgoes θ, but guarantees that his public rating does not change. By commit-
ting the crime (the second argument inside the max operator), the criminal
guarantees himself θ, but runs the risk of getting caught and worsening his
public rating.
As makes intuitive sense, the following lemma shows that criminals’ ex-
pected lifetime utility decreases in their criminal history and increases in the
attractiveness of the opportunity at hand.
Lemma 8. The value function for criminals under the strict notification
system is decreasing in the length of criminal history and increasing in the
attractiveness of the criminal opportunity at hand.
All proofs will be collected in the appendix.
Publicly Known Criminals I begin by studying the behavior and value of
publicly known criminals. This is done for two reasons. First, we must under-
stand the publicly known criminals’ cutoff opportunity in order to determine
the overall crime rate. Second, the publicly known criminals’ value is needed
in order to study the problem of an unknown criminal whose misdeeds could
result in a bad public rating.
Under the strict system, agents with h ≥ 1 have r = b for the rest of
their lives. Since they will be publicly known as criminals for as long as they
live, their continuation value is independent of their action and the outcome
of any crime committed. Their optimal action therefore depends only on the
immediate return; they behave as if totally myopic.
If a publicly known criminal chooses to behave he gets an immediate
payoff of zero. If he chooses to commit the crime, he gets an immediate
expected payoff of θ − δτ because with probability δ he is caught and must
pay the penalty of τ . Publicly known criminals commit crimes if and only if
the expected immediate return is positive.
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Lemma 9. Publicly known criminal’s optimal behavior is defined by a cutoff
opportunity θb such that the criminal commits crimes if and only if θ ≥ θb.
The cutoff opportunity θb is increasing in the detection rate and the penalty
if caught. The publicly known criminal’s value is decreasing in the detection
rate and the penalty if caught.
That the publicly known criminals behave myopically makes the algebraic
derivation of their cutoff opportunity and value function very simple. The
cutoff opportunity does not depend on any endogenous objects (such as value)
and so finding the cutoff opportunity simply requires solving a 1 equation – 1
unknown “system”. I now turn to analyzing an unknown criminal’s problem
where, unfortunately, such a simplification is not possible.
Unknown criminals Now I derive the optimal behavior of agents with h =
0 under the strict system. The analysis here is complicated by the fact
that unknown criminals behave in a forward looking manner. Their optimal
behavior is defined by a cutoff opportunity which depends on endogenous
objects. In order to solve for the cutoff value and the value function, a
system of equations is needed.
Unknown criminals receive wage ` at the start of the period (regardless
of any criminal activity) because firms believe they might be good citizens.
If he behaves, the criminal gets an immediate return of ` and the expected
continuation value of an unknown criminal because his criminal record will
remain unchanged. If he chooses to commit the crime, he gets an immediate
return of ` plus the expected value of the committing the crime, equal to
θ − δτ . The continuation value in this case depends on whether or not the
agent is caught. With probability δ he will be caught and his continuation
value will be that of a publicly known criminal. With probability 1−δ he will
not be caught, his public rating will remain the same, and his continuation
value will be that of an unknown criminal.
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Lemma 10. Unknown criminals’ optimal behavior is defined by a cutoff
opportunity θg which is increasing in labor income, the detection rate, and
the penalty if caught. The ordering of θg and θb depends on the parameters
of the model. The unknown criminal’s value is decreasing in the detection
rate and the penalty if caught.
When ` = 0, the unknown criminal’s cutoff opportunity is less than that
of the publicly known criminal; there are no future wages to lose and the
probability of detection is lower so they commit more crimes. As ` increases,
the unknown criminal’s cutoff opportunity could be less than or greater than
the known criminal’s, depending on the value of δ − δ. When δ is close to δ,
the cutoff opportunity for the unknown criminal is higher; he is more careful
deciding which crimes to commit because he doesn’t want to get caught and
lose future earnings. When δ is small enough, his cutoff is lower because he
can get away with more.
Ultimately, criminals’ behavior is important only insofar as it determines
the overall, steady state crime rate. In the Crime Rates section I will compute
the crime rate induced by the strict system, but next I study how adding
leniency to the notification policy changes the incentives for the criminals.
The Lenient System
In this section I will discuss the optimal behavior of criminals under the
lenient system. The discussion is less detailed because the analysis is me-
chanically very similar to the previous section. The main difference is due
to the intermediate type who does have a criminal history but is allowed to
withhold this information from the public.
I first show that the publicly known criminal’s problem under the lenient
system is the same as under the strict system. Then, the problem for crimi-
nals known only to the authorities is similar to that of the unknown criminal
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under strict system except the probability of detection is greater (δ1 instead
of δ). Lastly, I show that agents with h = 0 commit more crimes under the
lenient system. To declare that leniency is better for society requires that
the intermediate type with a good public rating and one prior conviction
have a low crime rate and that criminal types without any convictions do
not commit too many more crimes when the government is lenient.
Similar to the previous section, write the value function for an agent with
history h and opportunity θ under the concealing system as
w(h, θ) = max { `(mL(h)) + βEθ[w(h, θ′)],
`(mL(h)) + θ − δL(h)τ + βEh,θ[w(h′, θ′)]}
As under the strict system, criminals’ expected lifetime utility is decreas-
ing in the number of times they have been caught committing crimes and
increasing in the attractiveness of the opportunity at hand.
Lemma 11. The value function under the lenient system is decreasing in the
length of criminal history and increasing in the attractiveness of the criminal
opportunity at hand.
The proof is the same as in Lemma 8. The next lemma shows that the
behavior and value of publicly known criminals is independent of notification
system.
Lemma 12. Publicly known criminals have the same value and optimal cut-
off opportunities under the lenient system as they do under the strict system.
The government’s notification policy has no bearing on the publicly known
criminals’ decision; their identity has already been disclosed to the public.
I use θ2 to represent the cutoff opportunity for a publicly known criminal
under the lenient system. Lemma 12 says that θ2 = θb.
I now study the problem of criminals who have been convicted of one
crime under the lenient system. These criminals are known to the authorities,
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but not the public. Their problem is very similar to that of the unknown
criminals under the strict system. Each is able to receive a wage because they
are not known to the public as criminals, and each will transition to being a
publicly known criminal with one more conviction. Lemma 12 implies that
the consequences of a conviction are the same for each type of criminal, but
those on their last strike under the lenient system are more likely to be caught
because the authorities are aware of their identity and hence the probability
of detection is higher.
Lemma 13. Agents convicted of one crime under the lenient system have
cutoff opportunity θ1 which is increasing in labor income, the detection rate
and the penalty if caught. Importantly, these agents have a higher cutoff
opportunity, and hence a lower crime rate, than the unknown criminals under
the strict system.
The proof is in the appendix but, intuitively, agents convicted of one
crime under the lenient system and agents without any convictions under
the strict system have almost identical problems. The only difference is in
the detection rate. Since the cutoff is increasing in the detection rate, agents
convicted of one crime under the lenient system have a higher detection rate.
The last lemma on criminal behavior shows that leniency deters less crime
by unknown criminals than a strict public notification policy.
Lemma 14. Agents without a criminal history have higher values and com-
mit more crimes under the lenient system than under the strict system.
This lemma makes intuitive sense; the difference between the two situ-
ations is in the consequences if caught. If the unknown criminal under the
lenient system mimicked the optimal behavior of an unknown criminal under
the strict system, he would be caught just as often but the consequences
would be less dire. His value must be higher using this mimicking strategy.
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He can do even better, though, by using a lower cutoff opportunity and com-
mitting more crimes. Since his continuation value decreases less when he
is convicted, the consequences are lower and it becomes worth his while to
commit crimes which the agent under the strict system would not.
In summary, known criminals behave the same way under either informa-
tion system. Agents with h = 1 and h = 0 have behavior defined by optimal
cutoff values θ1 and θ0, resp., which are increasing in the probability of de-
tection, the penalty if caught, and the size of the drop in expected value if
caught. Importantly, the order of these cutoff values is θ0 < θg < θ1, meaning
that unknown criminals under the lenient system commit more crimes than
unknown criminals under the strict system, who in turn commit more crimes
than criminals with one conviction under the lenient system. If temporarily
concealing criminal status is to induce a lower crime rate, it will be because
the higher crime rate of the criminal types without any convictions will be
more than offset by the lower crime rate of criminals with one conviction.
Crime rates
So far we have studied the behavior (i.e. crime rate) of each type of criminal.
In order to determine the overall crime rate, however, we need to know how
many criminals of each type exist. That is, we must find the steady state
composition of the criminal population.
I will first derive the composition under the strict system, and then state
the analogous results for the lenient system. I use graphs of value functions
in order to illustrate when and why each information system minimizes the
crime rate.
Population Composition Under the Strict System
The probability a criminal of type k ∈ {0, 1, 2, g, b} gets an opportunity
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worth exercising is 1 − θk. Each period the total mass of criminals is one
because the mass is initially one and the mass of criminals dying each period
is exactly offset the mass entering the model.
Let ξkg be the mass of unknown criminals (i.e. r = g) under the strict
system at the start of period k. Then fraction 1 − θg get an attractive
enough opportunity and fraction 1− δ of these agents do not get caught and
maintain a good rating. The mass of unknown criminals after the “commit-
or-not” decision is then ξkg
(
θg + (1− θg)(1− δ)
)
. Of these, fraction 1 − β
die, and then a mass 1−β new criminals enter without any criminal history,
and are therefore unknown criminals. So at the start of period k+1 the mass
of unknown criminals is ξk+1g = 1− β + βξkg (1− δ(1− θg)). The steady state
is where ξkg = ξ
k+1
g . The value which solves this equation is
ξg =
1− β
1− β + βδ − βδθg
Since under the strict system there are only two relevant histories for
criminal types, the steady state mass of known criminals is ξb = 1− ξg. The
steady state crime rate under the strict system is then ρS = ξg(1 − θg) +
ξb(1− θb).
Population Composition Under the Lenient System
The calculations are very similar, so I will simply state the results. The
only additional complication is that some agents transition into, and some
transition out of, the h = 1 history under the lenient system. The steady
state mass of unknown criminals and criminals who are known only to the
authorities are:
ξ0 =
1− β
1− β + βδ − βδ θ0
; ξ1 =
β(1− β)(1− θ0)δ
(1− β + βδ − βδ θ0)(1− β + βδ1 − βδ1θ1)
Since there are only three types of criminals under the temporarily concealing
system, ξ2 = 1−ξ0−ξ1. The steady state crime rate under the lenient system
is ρL = ξ0(1− θ0) + ξ1(1− θ1) + ξ2(1− θ2).
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Which System Minimizes the Crime Rate?
The first main result of this paper is that sometimes leniency in the gov-
ernment’s public notification policy can result in a lower crime rate. While
those publicly known to be criminals behave the same under both information
systems, criminals who are unknown to the public face different incentives.
Agents with one conviction under the lenient system can be induced to behave
if their probability of detection is close to that of a publicly known criminal
(i.e. δ − δ1 is small) and the labor income they stand to lose if caught one
more time is large. Agents without a criminal history commit more crimes
under the lenient system, but when criminals have long expected lifetimes,
the proportion of criminal types without any criminal record is small, and so
they do not contribute much to the overall crime rate.
Proposition 7. The lenient policy minimizes the crime rate when public
notification has a large negative effect on wages, a small positive effect on
detection probabilities, and criminals’ expected lifetime is long.
The results from the Criminal Behavior section imply that criminals with
one conviction under the lenient system behave better than those without
any criminal history. Additionally, criminals without any history under the
strict system behave worse than those with one conviction, but better than
those with no convictions, under the lenient system. Expressed in terms
of cutoff opportunities, θ1 > θg > θ0. Intuitively then, the lenient system
results in a lower crime rate if criminals with h = 1 make up a sufficiently
large portion of the population and their crime rate is sufficiently low relative
to criminals with h = 0.
In the remainder of this section, I graphically illustrate how `, δ1, and β
affect behavior and the composition of the criminal population. Each figure
shows the effects of changing one of the parameters of the model on criminal
behavior. In each case, the strict notification system is optimal before the
change, while the lenient system is optimal after.
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the effect of a wage increase on the behavior of the
different criminals. Each panel shows four value functions. The legend un-
derneath the graphs associates line-styles to criminal types, but the value
functions are always ordered, from lowest to highest, as: publicly known
criminals, criminals with h = 1 under L, criminals with h = 0 under S, and
criminals with h = 0 under L. The kink point in the value function repre-
sents the criminal’s cutoff opportunity: it is the opportunity at which value
transitions from being independent of opportunity to increasing in opportu-
nity.
The graphs show that as ` increases, the cutoff opportunity for agents with
h = 1 under the lenient system increases to nearly one; i.e. the crime rate for
these agents drops to nearly zero. Since very few crimes are committed by
criminals with one conviction under the lenient system, very few transition
on to be publicly known criminals. As these criminals have a relatively high
crime rate, this further helps lower the crime rate of the lenient system.
The increase in the wage also affects the behavior of criminals without any
convictions, but the change is less dramatic.
Figure 3.2 shows the effect of increasing δ1. Initially, δ1 is close to δ, which
is why the value functions for criminals with one conviction under the lenient
system and criminals with no convictions under the strict system are so close.
Since the consequences when caught are the same and the probabilities of
being detected are so close, these agents face similar problems.
After the increase, δ1 is close to δ, and the crime rate for criminals with
one conviction under the lenient system falls. It takes a very appealing
opportunity for these criminals to risk getting caught and transitioning to a
publicly known criminal, and thereby losing any future earnings.
The criminals without any convictions under the lenient system also com-
mit fewer crimes because they correctly forecast the lower value associated
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Figure 3.1 The Effect of an Increase in `
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with having one conviction after δ1 increases. The two types of criminals
under the strict system do not change their behavior because δ1 does not
affect either of their problems.
Since δ1 < δ, public notification is assumed to affect detection probabili-
ties in ways that police work alone cannot. How large this effect is in practice
is an empirical question. If having the public know a criminal’s identity has
little benefit beyond having the police know, then δ − δ1 is small. All else
equal, the lenient policy looks better when public notification has little ef-
fect on detection probabilities. If, after the first conviction, the detection
probability increases almost to the maximum level, there is little to gain by
notifying immediately. Instead, the government can withhold punishing the
criminal with public notification for the time being, and use this punishment
as a deterrent against future crimes, which are now detected at a high rate.
More than the other parameters, the probability a criminal lives from one
period to the next affects the overall crime rate through two channels: the
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Figure 3.2 The Effect of an Increase in δ1
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criminals’ behavior and the steady state composition of criminal types. To
see how the probability of living can affect the steady state composition of
criminals directly (i.e. not necessarily through changes in criminal behavior),
consider extreme values of β. When β is close to zero, even if the crime rates
are high, there are few publicly known criminals in the steady state simply
because criminals do not live long enough to be caught committing enough
crimes to become publicly known. Alternatively, when β is close to one, the
steady state criminal population consists of many publicly known criminals,
even if the crime rates are low, simply because criminals live so long that
they are eventually caught committing a crime.
Of course, the probability of living also directly affects the behavior of
non-publicly known criminals, as the lemmas in the Criminal Behavior sec-
tion describe. As β increases, criminal types who are not publicly known as
criminals expect to live longer and thus require better opportunities in order
to commit a crime.
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Table 3.1 details the composition of the criminal population when β in-
creases from 0.8 to 0.97 for the environment where ` = 2, δ = 0.1, δ1 = 0.19,
δ = 0.3, and τ = .8. The fraction of the criminal population without a con-
viction is roughly equal across the two information systems at the low value
of β. When the probability of living increases, the fraction of criminals with
at least one conviction increases more under the lenient system.
Table 3.1 Criminal Population Composition
Low β High β
h = 0 under IR: 0.76 0.42
h ≥ 1 under IR: 0.24 0.58
h = 0 under TC: 0.75 0.37
h = 1 under TC: 0.17 0.25
h ≥ 2 under TC 0.08 0.38
In this example, the strict system is optimal for the low β while the lenient
system is optimal for the high β. The reason this is the case can be seen in
Figure 3.3. After β increases, the probability a criminal with one conviction
under the lenient system commits a crime decreases so that a large enough
fraction of the criminal population gets “stuck” with one conviction and dies
before transitioning to being a publicly known criminal who commits a lot
of crimes.
That criminal activity depends on age is one of the most accepted theories
in criminology [Hirschi and Gottfredson [1983]]. The vast majority of crimes
ar committed by the young. But the length of criminals’ lifetimes varies
across the type of crime. There is evidence that criminal behavior by sex
offenders declines much more slowly in age than for other types of crimes
[Hanson [2002]].
In the context of this paper, this evidence suggests that the β for sex
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Figure 3.3 The Effect of an Increase in β
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offenders might be larger than the β for other types of criminals. If this
is the case, governments might consider leniency in their public notification
system. By holding the notification punishment in reserve, once-convicted
sex offenders might face strong enough incentives so that they do not commit
any more crimes.
These examples help to illustrate that the crime rate depends on both
criminals’ behavior and the number of each type of criminal in the population.
A lenient policy which temporarily conceals criminal status from the general
public can minimize the overall crime rate if it provides strong incentives for
criminals on their last strike, and these criminals make up a sufficiently large
percentage of the population.
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Productivity
The threat of public notification acts as a deterrent against criminal acts, but
its use is also costly for society. When the government makes a criminal’s
identity public, the criminal has difficulty finding work in the future. Public
notification of criminal histories therefore costs society a productive member.
While the crime rate can be minimized by either the strict or lenient pub-
lic notification policy depending on the environment, productivity is always
higher under the lenient notification policy.
Proposition 8. The productivity of the criminal population is always larger
when the government is lenient.
The productivity is higher under the lenient system because there are
more criminals with good public ratings. That is, they have not yet been
publicly outed as a criminal, either because they have not yet been caught
or because they have been caught only once. Since the public perceives them
as good, they are able to find gainful employment and remain productive
members of society.
The fact that it takes two convictions to become publicly known under
the lenient system as opposed to just one under the strict system is not
enough by itself to prove Proposition 8. The reason is that if the crime rates
of criminals with good public ratings induced by the lenient system were
very large compared to the crime rate of unknown criminals under the strict
system, there would be more publicly known criminals when the government
is lenient. The fact that criminals with one conviction under the lenient
policy have a higher cutoff opportunity, and hence a lower crime rate, than
unknown criminals under the strict policy keeps this from happening.
Proposition 8 shows how public notification can be costly for society. The
threat of public notification does act as a deterrent, but the lost productivity
of publicly known criminals hurts society. This provides some justification
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for leniency on the government’s behalf. Rather than hit first time offenders
with the full penalty (statutory plus public notification) immediately, the
government can hold some of its punishment in reserve and give the criminal
a second chance. This type of leniency always leads to a more productive
criminal population.
Optimal Public Notification Policies
Propositions 7 and 8 measure the efficacy of public notification policies on two
different metrics: minimizing the crime rate and maximizing productivity. In
practice governments likely care about both.
If the government doesn’t care about the productivity of its criminals at
all, then Proposition 7 specifies how to derive the optimal public notification
system. The more the government cares about lost productivity, the better
the lenient public notification policy looks. In the limit, when the government
only cares about productivity, the lenient policy is always optimal.
My results add to the literature on the shape of optimal penalty functions.
The government’s policy concerning the timing of public notification affects
the shape of the penalty function. In my model, with constant statutory
penalties, the strict notification system generates a decreasing penalty func-
tion and the lenient system generates a first increasing and then decreasing
penalty function. The lemmas in the Criminal Behavior section show how the
penalty generated by public notification depends on detection probabilities,
length of expected lifetime, and wages.
The public notification of criminal histories creates a penalty which can
only be used once. Depending on its objectives, the government can some-
times do better by penalizing first time offenders lightly and waiting to use
the notification penalty on repeat offenders. This type of policy can minimize
the crime rate, but it always leads to greater productivity.
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Conclusion
The way in which governments reveal criminal status can affect criminals’
incentives for good behavior. This paper studies a strict and lenient notifica-
tion policy. The strict policy reveals criminal status after the first conviction,
while the lenient policy conceals criminal status until the criminal is caught
committing a second crime, at which time the criminal’s identity is made
public. When the government’s public notification policy is strict, the un-
known (i.e. not yet convicted) criminals face relatively greater incentives to
behave. In contrast, under the lenient policy, the unknown criminals face
low incentives while the once-convicted criminals who are known only to
the authorities face high incentives to behave. The lenient policy minimizes
the crime rate when public notification has a large negative effect on wages,
a small positive effect on detection probabilities, and a criminal’s expected
lifetime is long.
In contrast to that qualified result, the lenient policy always maximizes
the productivity of the criminal population. When the government is lenient,
fewer criminals are publicly identified as such, and more criminals are there-
fore able to remain productive members of society. Public notification is
effective as a deterrent against crime, but it is also costly to society in terms
of productivity. An optimal public notification policy balances these costs
and benefits according to the government’s preference for a low crime rate
and its distaste for the lost productivity of the publicly known criminals.
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Appendix for Chapter 3 – Proofs
Proof of Lemma 8. Let V be the space of functions f : N× [0, θmax] 7→ R.
Define an operator
Tf(h, θ) = max { `(mS(h)) + βEθ[f(h, θ′)],
`(mS(h)) + θ − δS(h)τ + βEh,θ[f(h′, θ′)]}
Operator T : V 7→ V is a contraction because it satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient
conditions (i.e. it is monotone and it discounts).
Let f0(h, θ) be decreasing in h and increasing in θ. Then Tf0(h, θ) is
increasing in θ because the only time θ appears within the max is with a
positive coefficient. Also, Tf0(h, θ) is decreasing in h because each component
within the max operator is decreasing in h, and so the maximum is as well.
Since these weak properties are preserved by the operator, they must obtain
in the unique fixed point, v.
Proof of Lemma 9. Define Vb ≡ Eθ[v(h, θ)|h ≥ 1] as the expected value
of having rating r = b under S before the draw of θ is realized and behav-
ing optimally once it is. Then the immediately revealing value function for
publicly known criminals can be written
v(h, θ) = max
{
βVb, θ − δτ + βVb
}
(24)
The publicly known criminal optimally commits the crime if θ ≥ θb ≡ δτ ,
which is increasing in the probability of detection and the penalty if caught.
The publicly known criminal’s value function can be written as a piecewise
function:
v(h, θ) =
{
βVb if θ < θb;
θ − δτ + βVb if θ ≥ θb.
Since θ ∼ U [0, 1],
E
[
θ − δτ + βVb|θ ≥ θb
]
=
θb + 1
2
− δτ + βVb
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The equation defining Vb is then:
Vb = θbβVb + (1− θb)
(
θb + 1
2
− δτ + βVb
)
Solving for Vb gives
Vb =
1− θb
1− β
(
θb + 1
2
− δτ
)
which is decreasing in δ and τ . It is then easy to see that all components of
equation 24 are decreasing in δ and τ .
Proof of Lemma 10. Define Vg ≡ Eθ[v(0, θ)] as the expected value of hav-
ing rating r = g under S before the opportunity is realized and behaving
optimally once it is. Then the value function for unknown criminals can be
written
v(0, θ) = max
{
`+ βVg, `+ θ − δτ + β
(
(1− δ)Vg + δVb
)}
(25)
The unknown criminal optimally commits the crime if
θ ≥ θg ≡ βδ (Vg − Vb) + δτ (26)
An implication of Lemma 8 is that Vg−Vb > 0, so θg > 0. Equation 26 gives
one equation in two unknowns: Vg and θg. Since they are determined jointly,
a two equation system is needed to solve for the expected continuation value
and the cutoff opportunity. In order to come up with another equation, I
write Vg as the expectation of a piecewise linear function, as in the proof of
Lemma 9.
Vg = θg(`+ βVg) + (1− θg)
(
`+
θg + 1
2
− δτ + β ((1− δ)Vg + δVb)
)
(27)
Equations (26) and (27) form a system of two equations and two unknowns
and can be solved for θg and Vg. The solution is suppressed due to space
constraints.
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Comparative statics on θ cannot be computed directly because the cutoff
opportunity depends on the endogenous value:
∂θg
∂δ
= β(Vg − Vb) + τ + βδ∂Vg
∂δ
;
∂θg
∂τ
= δ + βδ
∂Vg
∂τ
In order to compute ∂Vg/∂δ and ∂Vg/∂τ , I use the fact that θ is the oppor-
tunity which maximizes the right hand side of (27). Differentiating equation
27 with respect to δ and applying the Envelope Theorem gives
∂Vg
∂δ
=
−(1− θg)(β(Vg − Vb) + τ)
1− β + βδ − βδθg
Differentiating equation 27 with respect to τ and again applying the Envelope
Theorem gives
∂Vg
∂τ
=
−(1− θg)δ
1− β + βδ − βδθg
I note that these partial derivatives of Vg are negative. Substituting these
expressions back into ∂θg/∂δ and ∂θg/∂τ gives
∂θg
∂δ
= (β(Vg − Vb) + τ)
(
1− βδ − βδθg
1− β + βδ − βδθg
)
∂θg
∂τ
= δ
(
1− βδ − βδθg
1− β + βδ − βδθg
)
Each of these expressions is positive because the fraction is less than one,
implying that the optimal cutoff opportunity increases in both the detection
rate and the penalty if caught.
Lastly, since Vg is decreasing in δ and τ , it is easy to see that the value
function from (25) is also decreasing in δ and τ .
Proof of Lemma 12. A publicly known criminal’s problem under the TC
system is
w(h, θ) = max
{
βW2, θ − δτ + βW2
}
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This equation is identical to the the value function of the publicly known
criminal under the S system from equation 24. The maximum and the max-
imizer are therefore the same.
Proof of Lemma 13. The derivation of θ1 is identical to that of θg except
using δ1 as the detection probability. From Lemma 10, we know that the
cutoff is increasing in the detection rate. Since δ1 > δ, we get θ1 > θg.
Proof of Lemma 14. Agents with h = 0 receive the same wage and face
the same probability of detection under each information system. To show
w(0, θ) > v(0, θ), let the agent under L mimic the agent under S. Then he
gets caught just as often, but the circumstances are less dire. If caught, he
becomes a h = 1 agent under L which has a higher value than being a known
criminal under S because w is decreasing in h and w(2, θ) = v(1, θ).
To show that θ0 < θg is more complicated, but also uses arguments based
on mimicking behavior. Let Wx be an unknown criminal’s expected lifetime
utility before observing the opportunity θ under L while using the cutoff x
when h = 0 and behaving optimally once convicted. Then Wx solves
Wx = `+ xβWx + (1− x)
(
1 + x
2
− τδ + β((1− δ)Wx + δW1)
)
(28)
Denote by Wg ≡ Wx|x=θg ; that is, Wg is the expected utility of an unknown
criminal under the lenient system who mimicks the unknown criminal under
the strict system until convicted, and then behaves optimally afterwards.
As an intermediary step, I first show that Wg −W1 < Vg − V1. This fact
will be useful later in the proof. Subtracting W1 from both sides of equation
28 evaluated at x = θg gives
Wg−W1 = `+βθg(Wg−W1)+(1−θg)
(
1 + θg
2
− δτ + β(1− δ)(Wg −W1)
)
−(1−β)W1
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Solving for Wg −W1 gives
Wg −W1 =
`+ (1− θg)
(
1+θg
2
− δτ
)
− (1− β)W1
1− θgβ − (1− θg)β(1− δ)
Analogous operations on Vg give
Vg − Vb =
`+ (1− θg)
(
1+θg
2
− δτ
)
− (1− β)Vb
1− θgβ − (1− θg)β(1− δ)
Since W1 > Vb and the other terms in the fractions are identical, we see that
Wg −W1 < Vg − Vb.
Differentiating equation 28 in x gives the rate of change of value as the
cutoff changes. The formula is
∂Wx
∂x
=
−x+ δτ + βδ(Wx −W1)
1− β + βδ − βδx
Evaluating this derivative at x = θg gives
∂Wx
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=θg
=
−θg + δτ + βδ(Wg −W1)
1− β + βδ − βδθg
<
−θg + δτ + βδ(Vg − Vb)
1− β + βδ − βδθg
= 0
The inequality holds because Wg − W1 < Vg − Vb, and the equality holds
because θg is optimal for unknown criminals under S and the first order
condition gives θg = δτ + βδ(Vg − Vb).
This means the unknown criminal under the lenient system who is mim-
icking the unknown criminal under the strict system could increase his ex-
pected utility by decreasing his cutoff opportunity; that is, he could use some
x < θg and increase his utility. But this is still a local argument; it is pos-
sible some x > θg maximizes utility. To make the argument global, assume
towards a contradiction that θ0 > θg. Then since lifetime expected utility is
continuous and differentiable in the cutoff opportunity, it must be the case
that there is some θ′ > θg at which lifetime expected utility attains a local
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minimum. If this is true, the slope of lifetime expected utility in the cutoff
is necessarily zero. But the second order condition holds whenever the first
order condition holds, so there cannot be a local minimum at θ′. That is,
whenever the slope of the objective function is zero, the second derivative is
negative and we are at a local maximum, not a local minimum. This proves
that θ0 < θg, and therefore unknown criminals commit more crimes under L
than they do under S.
Proof of Proposition 8. I find the value of θg which solves the equation
ξ0 + ξ1 = ξg. The cutoff value for unknown criminals under S which equates
the mass of unknown criminals under the two notification systems is
θg =
1− β + βδ(1− θ0) + θ0βδ1(1− θ1)
1− β + βδ(1− θ0) + βδ1(1− θ1)
≡ h(θ1)
I will show that h(θ1 ≥ θ1, and since Lemma 13 shows that θg < θ1 ≤ h(θ1),
it cannot be the case that θg = h(θ1. The mass of unknown criminals across
rating systems cannot be equal. Since the mass of unknown criminals under
S is decreasing in θg, this proves that the mass of criminals with a good
public rating is always larger when the government is lenient.
First note that
h(1) =
1− β + βδ(1− θ0)
1− β + βδ(1− θ0)
= 1
But since θg < θ1 by Lemma 13, it cannot be the case that the mass of
unknown criminals is equal across notification policies if θ1 = 1.
I next show that the slope of the function h is less than one. This, along
with the fact that h(1) = 1 proves that h(θ1) ≥ θ1. Differentiating the
function h gives
h′(θ1) =
βδ1(1− θ0)(1− β + βδ − βδθ0)
(1− β + βδ − βδθ0) + βδ1(1− θ1)
< 1
Then at any value θ1 ∈ [0, 1), h(θ1) > θ1.
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But Lemma 13 says that θg < θ1. This means that θg < θ1 < h(θ1), and
so the mass of unknown criminals cannot be equal across the two notification
systems.
All that remains is to show that the mass of unknown criminals is larger
under the lenient system, and hence productivity is higher. The mass of
unknown criminals under S decreases in θg because the higher is the cutoff,
the less crimes get committed, and less criminals are caught and then become
publicly known criminals. Then since θg < h(θ1), the mass of unknown
criminals is larger under the strict system.
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